Recommended Performance Management System
The following post has two assignments namely;
1.Recommended Performance Management System
Develop an appropriate performance management system for your organization. Include
strategies and general considerations, design, implementation, and evaluation as well as justification/rationale for your recommendations
2.Human Dimensions of Global Forests
1. High Park in Toronto is famous for its Cherry bloom during the spring season. Lots of people from Greater Toronto area visit the park during the one week period of Cherry bloom. Parks, Forestry and Recreation department of the City of Toronto appointed you as consultant to estimate the economic value of Cherry bloom to the society. They want to convince the Mayor to increase their budgetary allocation to maintain the park. The authorities provided you following data about the number of visitors coming to park from different zones around the park during one week period in May 2016.
Zone Zone Population Total visits during
the week Visits per thousand of
Population Cost of travel
(To and fro)
0 100000 2000 20 0
1 400000 6800 17 5
2 500000 6500 13 10
3 500000 4000 8 15
4 500000 1000 2 20
Beyond 4 0 0
Total visits 20,300
a. Assume that people living in all the zones are similar in taste and income, and also that they would respond to the introduction of entry fee to the park in the same manner as they respond to increase in travel cost. Calculate the total economic benefit provided by the Cherry bloom to the society in one week using the zonal travel cost method. [5 x 6 = 30]
i. Calculate the total number of visits to the Park by introducing $5 entry fee. ii. Calculate the total number of visits to the Park by introducing $10 entry fee.
iii. Calculate the total number of visits to the Park by introducing $15 entry fee. iv. Calculate the total number of visits to the Park by introducing $20 entry fee. v. Draw the site demand curve using the result of (i.) to (iv.) above.
vi. Find the area below the site demand curve to find out the economic benefit.
b. Park authorities are mulling to introduce some kind of entry fee to the park during the bloom period. What entry fee would you recommend so that park authorities maximize the revenue? 
2. Explain the concept of ordinal utility. In the fuelwood collection game that we discussed in the class, assume that farmers have social preference (i.e. they care about other farmer(s), value the growth in their forest, follow the norms that lead to sustainability etc.). Specifically assume that their preferences over action profile is as below:
Farmer-1: (Sus, Sus) ? (Sus, Unsus) ? (Unsus, Unsus) ? (Unsus, Sus)
Farmer-2: (Sus, Sus) ? (Unsus, Sus) ? (Unsus, Unsus) ? (Sus, Unsus)
a. Using the concept of ordinal utility, assign appropriate numbers to the utilities of the farmers over the action profile. 
b. Represent the situation as a strategic game in a table and find the Nash equilibrium(s). 
3. Two farmers living in a village have just planted Teak plants in a nearby bare forest plot. They must protect their plantation from the damage by wild boars in the night. Wild boars come from two different sides of the plantation from the nearby forests. To protect the plantation, they both must guard the plantation from two different sides staying up whole nights. If any one of them betrays and goes to sleep, the plantation will be destroyed forever. Consider that both the farmers are similar in their preferences over the success of plantation and sleeping. They both get a utility of 4 units if plantation is saved — (they can sell the mature teak in the market after some years and earn money). They both get utility of 2 units from having a good night’s sleep in their cozy beds, irrespective of whether other person guards the forest or sleeps. A farmer, however, gets a utility of 0 units when he guards the one end entire night sacrificing his sleep, while his friend sleeps and consequently plantation is destroyed by the wild boars from the other end.
a. Assuming that each farmer has two actions to choose from— ‘Guard’ or ‘Sleep’, model the situation as a strategic game. Specifically, draw a 2 x 2 table showing the payoff of each farmer over the action profiles. 
b. What is (are) the equilibrium(s) of this game? 
c. Which action is riskier of the two — ‘Guard’ or ‘Sleep’? (Risky action here means the action which may result in more loss of utility, if other person betrays.) 
d. Which action the farmers are likely to choose, if there is lack of assurance from either side?  Can you see why it is difficult to unite people for a public cause, if there is atmosphere of distrust?
4. Assume that two countries Canada and China produce just two goods— particle board, plywood sheets— in their economies. Also assume that there is no currency in the system and countries, if willing to trade, just exchange the two goods. The only input being used in the production of the goods is the Labour. Canada can produce 10 particle boards or
25 plywood sheets in 100 hours. China can produce 20 particle boards or 50 plywood sheets in 100 hours. [5 + 5 + 10 = 20]
a. Does any country have absolute advantage in the production of the goods?
b. Does any country have the comparative advantage in producing the particle boards? c. Does there exist a feasible exchange rate between particle board and plywood sheet (tonnes particle board / tonnes plywood sheet)? If yes, show that if countries specialize and trade at this exchange