Thirteen year-old Olivia lives with her two younger brothers and father, Mr. Tom Assing. Mr Assing is an alcoholic and becomes violent when drunk. He has lost many jobs because of his drinking but has recently obtained employment as a gas station attendant. Olivia is responsible for caring for her younger brothers. She prepares most of their meals, makes sure they go to school and helps them with their homework. Her father refuses to help with the household tasks as he believes that it prepares Olivia for her role in the home. As a result she is always tired, misses a lot of school and feels isolated from her friends. Her younger brothers are also becoming very disruptive because of the lack of adult supervision and parental involvement. The conditions of the household reflect severe poverty and deprivation. Olivia’s mother is living and working in the United States of America. Olivia’s mother left because Mr. Assing was physically abusive. She has no intention of returning home to the Caribbean and has not written or sent money in a long time. Olivia is depressed. She has become withdrawn and is unable to eat and sleep properly. She cries persistently, lacks interest in anything and suffers mood swings. You have been assigned as the social worker to this case. Identify your client and in your plan of action:
There is no word limit as you are asked specific questions
a) Describe two goals of social work that are applicable for this case and provide a rationale for your choices.
b) Describe how you would use the generalist intervention model and apply any particular social work theory
c) Describe Olivia’s stage of life and the life tasks she has to achieve in this stage of life
d) Identify one gender issue evident in this case and how it has impacted on the family’s functioning?
Is China Facing a Financial Crisis? Disclaimer: This work has been put together by an understudy. This isn’t a case of the work composed by our expert scholastic scholars. You can see tests of our expert work here. Any feelings, discoveries, ends or proposals communicated in this material are those of the writers and don’t really mirror the perspectives of UK Essays. Distributed: Mon, 02 Oct 2017 In a first for Chinese Banks and its Big Four, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) unseated Exxon Mobil a year ago to take the best spot on the Forbes Global 2000[i] as the world’s biggest organization. China Construction Bank climbed 11 spots to No. 2 on the rundown. Farming Bank of China remained at No. 8 and Bank of China with its twofold digit development in deals and benefits; enhanced its positioning by 10 spots to No. 11[ii]. Anyway is all the more fascinating that ICBC, world’s biggest and most beneficial bank itself was nearly defaulting until a very late choice to safeguard it out prior in January this year. A 3 Billion Yuan (around $500 million) item issued by China Credit Trust Co., a shadow bank and promoted through ICBC was supported by an advance to a mining task of Shanxi Zhenfu Energy Group that later crumbled as the cost of coal dove. Financial specialists were guaranteed a strong 10% yearly return more than three years, however were advised in January not to expect installment. A portion of the financial specialists, who allegedly put as much as $500,000 each into the reserve, said ICBC ought to repay them since it had promoted the item. ICBC demanded that it had never ensured the item, and had no legitimate duty to pay financial specialists. The bank’s executive even went so far as to depict the scene as a learning open door for speculators, shadow banks and ICBC. Anyway the learning opportunity was missed, because of a bailout by an anonymous outsider that guaranteed speculators will recuperate their underlying venture, however premium won’t be paid[iii]. Shadow Banking in China involves a snare of non-banks that incorporates pawn shops, underground banks, different riches administration items, trust organizations, and underwriters – huge numbers of which don’t take stores to guarantee against dangerous loaning exercises and work totally past the eye of controllers and authorities.These firms offer advances to organizations or people that may experience difficulty anchoring customary bank financing. Regularly, the advances are then bundled and sold to financial specialists searching for higher returns. In China, the segment’s correct reach is obscure, yet a few evaluations put its size at about 60% of China’s GDP[iv]. The China Banking Regulating Commission (CBRC) tops the estimation of credits that banks can stretch out with respect to the estimation of stores at 75%. In view of this top, banks want to issue shaky sheet advances with a specific end goal to keep up lower credit to-store proportions (LDRs).While the most recent assessments for loaning from China’s greatest banks put February 14’s new advances at 800 Billion Yuan, the most astounding February figure since the 4 Trillion Yuan boost in 2009, reports are rising that the quality in new advances isn’t driven by genuine interest, yet rather by banks getting reeling sheet advances on to the accounting report as a major aspect of the administration’s more extensive crackdown on shadow banking[v]. It is one of the numerous pointers that imply the stoppage of Chinese economy. In 2012, there were two trust defaults, one for an item conveyed by Huaxia BankLtd. what’s more, one sold by CITIC Trust. While it was found out thatZhongfa Industrial Groupin the end ensured the principal, the answer for the second was never made public[vi]. Beijing realizes that a default could incite financial specialists to pull theirmoneyfrom other trust items and quit giving the stores expected to supply credit and fuel monetary development. A default would almost certainly prompt lost trust in China’s trust and other shadow credit markets and a shrinkage of liquidity in those business sectors, and henceforth, a credit crunch. A few investigators anyway contend that a default is expected to show Beijing’s pledge to permit showcase powers to assume a bigger job in the economy, and to make an impression on speculators that high return ventures convey critical hazard. The China Banking Regulatory Commission said non-performing credits (NPLs) made by Chinese loan specialists achieved 592 Billion Yuan in the last three months of a year ago. The last NPLs were at a similar level was September 2008, the month when US venture bank Lehman Brothers crumbled. Credits by Chinese moneylenders have developed at an uncommon rate in the previous five years, with banks expanding the extent of their monetary records by 89 Trillion Yuan, a sum generally equal to the measure of the whole US managing an account industry[vii]. Chinese non-monetary organizations held aggregate remarkable bank acquiring and bond obligation of about $12 trillion toward the finish of a year ago – equivalent to more than 120 percent of GDP – as indicated by Standard and Poor’s estimates[viii]. Trust organizations alongside other non-bank monetary establishments, for example, securities businesses have turned into a fundamental wellspring of credit, enabling banks to orchestrate shaky sheet renegotiating for developing advances that unsafe borrowers, for example, the nearby government financing vehicles (LGFV) can’t reimburse from their inner income. By law, China’s neighborhood governments are not permitted to acquire. After the 2008 worldwide money related emergency, Beijing surrendered a few relaxations and nearby governments made LGFV (Local Government Financing Vehicles), otherwise called UDICs (Urban Development and Investment Companies), which however isolate from yet claimed or controlled by the neighborhood government, were allowed to acquire. The LGFV by and large obtained assets transcendently from banks (as much as at least 80%), with the rest of by issuing bonds or value like instruments to insurance agencies, institutional speculators and people. As of late, with weight on banks to abridge advances, these financing vehicles have acquired from China’s shadow saving money framework. Reviews discharged out of the blue demonstrate that China’s wealthiest eastern territories are the most obligated, however reimbursement troubles are more burdensome in poorer zones, for example, the southwestern areas. Tibet was the main locale that did not discharge a review report[ix]. As per insights from the National Audit Office, as of June 2013 government obligation at all levels totaled around 20.7 Trillion Yuan (US$3.4 trillion), of which residential government obligation represented around 10.9 Trillion Yuan (US$1.8 trillion). Of this sum, 2.39 Trillion Yuan (US$390 billion), or 22%, is expected in spring of this year[x]. We can include that including the neighborhood government obligation that develops this year, there is an expected 5 Trillion Yuan of trust items that are developing, including as much as 1 Trillion Yuan in May[xi]. On the off chance that the China Credit Trust item was permitted to default, China’s monetary framework may have been perched on several billions, if not trillions of Yuan worth of non-performing advances in only a couple of months time. Chinacan once in a while permit corporate disappointments, especially of state-sponsored organizations, mostly out of dread that across the board cutbacks could prompt social turmoil. This makes things all the harder for the People’s Bank of China particularly when interbank rates are at a record-breaking high to control the neighborhood obligation. Encourage the rising Chinese Yuan, which has picked up around 33% since 2005 against the U.S. money, builds their profits has prompted asurge in credits to Chinese organizations from outside the nation has added to enormous inflows of money into the terrain (fundamentally here and now and theoretical in nature), endeavoring to benefit from the territory’s moderately highinterest rates[xii]. Henceforth when the more the PBOC directs into the framework, the more it empowers hazardous loaning, driving the nation more like an obligation emergency. In any case, when the national bank has declined to add money to the framework—remarkably in June and December of 2013—liquidity has seized up. The size of trust resources anyway still could not hope to compare to add up to managing an account division resources of in excess of 100 TrillionYuanas of the finish of June. Be that as it may, without trusts, the managing an account framework’s non-performing credits (NPL) proportion may be considerably higher, albeit precise assessments are not possible[xiii]. China bears contend that a lion’s share of the trust advances can’t be reimbursed, which will in the long run require generous bailouts and prompt a crumple in the saving money framework and a bigger monetary emergency. Regardless of whether this is overstated and the advantages are great, tremendous liquidity dangers exist given the known bungle between the span of trust advances and their hidden speculations.>