Locate the QuadCouncilCompetenciesforPublicHealthNurses document in the Resources tab. Imagine you are the nurse consultant at the state department of health. This presenation has been sent by an advocacy group to the Governor for him to make the program funding requests and recommendations. As the nursing director, you have been assigned to the “Fact Check” which includes checking for accuracy of all the information. Based upon your research, select two core competencies and summarize for the Governor the need for the services and how this may positively impact public health.
• Identify the three basic concepts which are the foundation of epidemiological perspective on health and illness.
• Define endemic, pandemic, epidemic, hypperendemic, and sporadic as it relates to disease.
• Describe the three epidemiological models and how they could be used in public health nursing.
• Define risk as an epidemiological concept. Differentiate between absolute and relative risk.
• Distinguish between morbidity and mortality risks.
• Describe the concept of surveillance and its relationship to population health nursing.
• Identify the essential components of a community assessment.
monitor firm performance. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003)11 provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Marsh (1997)12 has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Denis and Denis (1994)13 found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders’ wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders’ wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996)14, provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite conclusions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)15 found little evidence of an association between total institutional ownership and other possible control mechanisms (e.g., insider ownership, block holders, outside directors, CEO human capital, and leverage). Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996)16 focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firm’s in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations don’t exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals.>