Text Readings:
1: [Plato: Complete Works, ed. J. M. Cooper (Hackett, 1997) ] - Laches and/or Charmides.
and/or
2: [Xenophon. Conversations of Socrates, trans. Waterfield & Tredennick (Penguin, 1990) ] - Memoirs of Socrates III.1-5, 12 and/or, Memoirs of Socrates I.3, 5; II.1; III.14; IV.5 .
1) At Laches (= La.) 190d-e, Socrates levels his famous request for a definition, in this case, of andreia or “courage.” Laches’ first two attempts at a definition (190e, 192c) fail by Socrates’ lights, but those failures tells us a bit more about what Socrates wants from a definition of a virtue like courage. Explain Socrates’ concept of a definition of virtue: what is it? what kind of definition of virtue does he want? will a dictionary definition suffice? if not, why not? what do Laches’ failures tell us about the constraints placed on a successful definition of virtue. Finally, do you think such a definition is possible? If so, why? If not, why not?
2) At La. 188c-189b, Laches complains how he sometimes appears to others as, alternately, a “discussion-hater” (misologos) and a “discussion-lover” (philologos), but he notes that Socrates kindles in him a love of discussion. What is Laches’ explanation of his varied appearance? Why does Socrates make him a discussion-lover? Why might someone think Laches’ account of Socrates here is in tension with Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge at 186b-e? Do you think there is a way to resolve this tension? If so, how? If not, why not?
3) At La. 195a-196b, Laches attacks Nicias’ definition of andreia and Nicias defends his definition. What is Nicias’ definition and what is Laches’ basic objection to it? Nicias offers a very nuanced diagnosis of their disagreement (195c-d); what is this diagnosis? What does it tell us about the kind of knowledge involved in Nicias’ definition of andreia as opposed to the kind of knowledge present in, e.g., medical knowledge? Do you think Nicias’ response to Laches’ objection works? If so, why? If not, why not?
4) At La. 198a-199d, Socrates deploys his elenchus against Nicias’ definition of andreia (198c) and argues that it is inconsistent with another commitment of Nicias. This depends on drawing out a certain implication of Nicias’ definition. What is that implication and how does Socrates argue that it derives from the definition? Do you think Socrates’ objection is fatal to Nicias’ definition, in particular, does the objection show a fault in Nicias’ definition alone (or, e.g., that definition together with other commitments of Nicias)? If so, why? If not, why not? Socrates’ argument here can be used to show that possession of andreia implies all the other virtues: how might one show that? Do you think this is a good argument? Why/why not?
Sample Solution