Critical Infrastructure and a Cyberattack
Critical Infrastructure and a Cyberattack
Presidential Decision Directive 21 (PDD-21) identifies 16 critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructures. PDD-21 lays out the national policy to main" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in secure, functionin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and resilient critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure. Select a critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure sector from the list below and discuss the impact that a cyberattack could have on that system or service: Communication Sector (voice communications, digital communications, or navigation) Energy Sector (electric power grid) Water and Wastewater Systems Sector (water supply or sewage) Healthcare and Public Health Sector (hospitals) Transportation Systems Sector (rail or air) Fin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inancial Services Sector (bankin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing ) It is the third and fourth order effects from the cyberattack on the chosen critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure that shows the far reachin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and devastatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing effect of a cyberattack. To demonstrate the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interconnectedness of critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure, explain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the cascadin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing effects on other critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure. Then, discuss the measures DHS has taken to ensure resiliency of the selected in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and the measures that need to be implemented in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the future. The Critical Infrastructure and a Cyberattack assignment Must be three to four pages in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in length (excludin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the title and reference pages) and formatted accordin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to APA style as outlin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ined in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the Ashford Writin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Center. Must in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">include an in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">introductory paragraph with a succin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inct thesis statement. The thesis must be in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in both the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">introduction and the conclusion. Must use at least three scholarly sources or official government sources in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in addition to the course text. *Must thoroughly explain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins the cascadin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing effects on other critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure. *Must thoroughly discusses the measures DHS has taken to ensure resiliency of the selected in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and the measures that need to be implemented in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the future. *This assignment must display meticulous comprehension and organization of syntax and mechanics, such as spellin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and grammar. Written work contain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins no errors and is very easy to understand. *The use of transition words is a must. Reference: Text Kamien, D. (Ed.). (2012). The McGraw-Hill homeland security handbook: Strategic guidance for a coordin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inated approach to effective security and emergency management (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Chapter 2: The Terrorist Threat to Surface Transportation: The Challenge of Securin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Public Places Chapter 15: The Necessity of Interagency Collaboration Chapter 20: Critical Infrastructure and Interdependency Revisited Chapter 31: Role of Corporate Security Chapter 32: Corporate Emergency Management Chapter 34: Buildin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a Resilient Nation Article U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2014). Fiscal years 2014-2018 strategic plan. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY14-18%20Strategic%20Plan.PDF Mission 4: Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace This resource provides current in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">information on the Department of Homeland Security Mission 4: Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace. Web Pages U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2015, October 27). Critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure sectors. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/critical-in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure-sectors This website is the official website for the Department of Homeland Security and addresses the specific mission to enforce and admin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inister our immigration laws. You will need to review this website prior to completin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Discussion 1. Accessibility Statement Privacy Policy U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2015, January 8). Safeguard and secure cyberspace. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/safeguard-and-secure-cyberspace This website is the official website for the Department of Homeland Security and addresses the specific mission to safeguard and secure cyberspace. You will need to review this website prior to completin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Discussion 1. Recommended Resources Text Kamien, D. (Ed.). (2012). The McGraw-Hill homeland security handbook: Strategic guidance for a coordin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inated approach to effective security and emergency management (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Chapter 21: Homeland Security for Drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Water and Wastewater Utilities Chapter 22: Civil Aviation Security: On the Ground and In the Air Chapter 35: The Community Resilience System: Operationalizin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a Whole Community Approach Chapter 36: Collaboration Not Isolation: A Join" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">int Approach to Busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness Contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity and Resilience Article North American Electric Reliability Council. (2004, July 13). Technical analysis of the August 14, 2003 blackout: What happened, why, and what did we learn? Retrieved from http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/blackout/NERC_Fin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inal_Blackout_Report_07_13_04.pdf This article provides an example of the vulnerability of one critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure sector and will help with the successful completion of the Critical Infrastructure and a Cyberattack assignment.
Chapter Books for this Assignment
CHAPTER 21 461 HOMELAND SECURITY FOR DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER UTILITIES Stanley States, Ph.D. Director of Water Quality and ProductionPittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority Water utilities, both drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water and wastewater, provide essential services to the public on a 24/7/365 basis. They are designed with a great deal of redundancy to help ensure unin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interrupted service. Despite these efforts, utilities are potentially subject to in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interruptions resultin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing from a variety of emergencies. Natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, blizzards, earthquakes, tornadoes, floodin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing) and major accidents (fires, explosions, electrical power grid failures, equipment failures, accidental contamin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ination) have impacted utilities for years. While water systems have always been susceptible to emergencies caused by human activities, rangin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing from simple vandalism to thefts and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incidents perpetrated by disgruntled in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">insiders (e.g., employees, contractors), the attacks of September 11, 2001, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increased awareness of the possibility of a public utility bein" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing targeted by terrorists. As with most in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">industries, drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water and wastewater companies typically have limited money, staff, and time to prepare for emergencies. Utilities also have a number of other requirements that compete for limited resources. These in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">include dealin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing with agin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and respondin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to ever more strin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingent federal, state, and local regulations in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intended to protect the health and safety of the communities served. For drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water systems the overarchin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing regulation is the federal Safe Drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Water Act and its contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inually evolvin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing amendments governin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the chemical, microbiological, and radiological quality of drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water. For wastewater systems the primary regulation is the federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), which limits the public health and environmental impacts of the treated liquid effluent ultimately discharged to receivin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing streams and the waste biosolids disposed of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in landfills. Drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water and wastewater utilities must also respond to newly discovered public health and environmental contamin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inants such as the trace concentrations of pharmaceuticals, personal care products, and endocrin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine disruptors that have been detected in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in wastewater plant effluents, surface and ground waters, and even drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water supplies in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in recent years. Security and emergency preparedness needs are just one of a number of concerns for the water in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">industry. 462 Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2011, most emergency plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing at utilities focused on accidents, equipment failures, and the specific natural disasters that are most likely to occur in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in a given water system’s location. In the several year period immediately followin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing 9/11, the emphasis on emergency plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing for utilities shifted to in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incidents in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">initiated by humans. In fact, the federal Bioterrorism Act of 2002 mandated that all U.S. drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water utilities servin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing more than 3,300 persons conduct a formal vulnerability assessment to identify in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intentional acts to which a specific water system might be vulnerable. This regulation also required drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water utilities to update their emergency response plans to in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">include man-made events identified in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the vulnerability assessment. The major hurricanes of 2005 (Katrin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ina and Rita) redirected attention to vulnerabilities associated with natural disasters and refocused water utility emergency preparedness efforts to an “all hazards” approach. Several factors contribute to the difficulty experienced by water utilities in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in devotin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing money, staff, and time to security and emergency preparedness. First of all, there are relatively few regulations actually mandatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing that utilities devote significant resources to this area. In most states, the primary regulatory agency responsible for overseein" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the activities of drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water and wastewater utilities is usually the state department of environmental protection, environmental resources, or public health. These agencies typically require utilities to develop and main" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in emergency response plans (ERPs) and associated operations and main" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intenance plans (O&M plans). As mentioned, the federal government, under the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, required drin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing water systems (but not wastewater systems) to conduct formal vulnerability assessments and then to develop ERPs to in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">include man-made events. Other than these requirements, there are few regulations across the United States requirin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing specific actions by utilities in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the areas of security and emergency plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing.
CHAPTER 22 489 CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY: ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR Rafi Ron CEO, New Age Security Solutions (NASS) Robert Faber Former Senior Oversight Counsel, House Transportation Committee THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BATTLE OF AVIATION SECURITY Terrorism can be thought of as the use of violence, or the threat of violence to exert in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">influence over large segments of the civilian population to brin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing about change or create fear. Why do governments devote a disproportionate share of their resources to protect aviation as a potential target? With vulnerabilities in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in other transportation modes as well as stationary venues, what accounts for the persistent in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interest in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in airplanes and airports? The answer is likely found in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the nature of the aviation experience itself and the value terrorists place on elevatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing their “status” in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the eyes of their peers and rivals. Airplane travel by defin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inition is the transportation mode of choice to meet the time-sensitive needs of an in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increasin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingly fast-paced, just-in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in-time culture. It therefore enjoys greater prestige as a mode of travel and delivery and consequently as a target. Passengers who travel by air, for both busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness and leisure, are more likely to be opin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inion leaders and frequently have higher in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incomes than the populace at large—a status itself not lost on terrorist organizations. 490 To be sure, terrorists are also busy targetin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins (Madrid 2004), buses (London 2005), ships (Yemen 2000), and public gatherin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ings (repeatedly). But destroyin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a plane is the gold standard by which terrorists are measured. This is in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in part because of the effort that has been undertaken to make air travel secure. Terrorists who can penetrate the aviation security system feel they have accomplished more than less secure targets. But perhaps more fundamentally, air travel adds extra emotional potential. It embodies an additional element of “drama,” so compellin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in a media-driven culture. A certain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in percentage of passengers on all flights are afraid of flyin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the first place; therefore, tensions begin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in at an elevated level. People are well aware they uniquely lack control of their environment on an airplane. Quite in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">independent of terrorist in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intentions, air passengers depend on the expertise and judgment of hundreds of people to ensure a safe flight: pilots, mechanics, air traffic controllers, etc. Terrorists have the potential to enhance the drama and attract attention to their cause when they target aircraft. They can easily draw out a threat to aviation over a period of hours, preyin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing on the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inherent fear of an aviation passenger’s sense of vulnerability. If the terrorists choose, they have time to force travelers, media, governments, and the public to watch and agonize over the pendin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing disaster. All of these factors feed the fundamental goals of the terrorists: to raise their status among their peers and rivals by grabbin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the world’s attention and forcin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing decision makers to consider their policies and positions. In the terrorists’ world, enhancin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the respect for their family, tribe, or organization is the highest aspiration in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in this life and many believe “self-sacrifice” will brin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing their ultimate reward in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the hereafter. Such goals are more attractive than wealth or convenience or in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">integrity. They have succeeded if others respect them. It makes no difference whether it is brought about by admiration or fear; either one enhances their status. Their only fear is failure and the resultin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing dishonor. PRE–9/11 HISTORY Aviation hijackin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ings began as early as the 1930s, remain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a rare occurrence through the 1950s. For the most part, they were not carried out by terrorists. They were the activities of crimin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inals or people seekin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing political asylum. In the United States, little attention was given to the threat until the 1960s when an in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">international trend of hijackin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing airplanes to Cuba developed, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">includin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a couple of flights from U.S. airspace. Few of these flights resulted in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in personal in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">injuries.
CHAPTER 35 825 THE COMMUNITY RESILIENCE SYSTEM: OPERATIONALIZING A WHOLE COMMUNITY APPROACH M. J. Plodin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inec Community and Regional Resilience Institute INTRODUCTION The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has promulgated a new doctrin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine—A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management—to serve as a foundation for in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increasin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">individual preparedness and engagin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing with members of the community as vital partners in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in enhancin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the resiliency and security of our Nation.1 When successfully implemented, such an approach has tremendous potential for leveragin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing resources and energy in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the private and nonprofit sectors to enhance the resilience of communities. However, while emergency managers are bein" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing encouraged to use this new approach, there is little practical experience in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in this country to guide them. Further, a Whole Community approach calls on emergency managers to employ skills that may have been seldom needed in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the past. Most importantly, they are required to establish relationships and forge partnerships with others in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the community—to move from command-and-control to collaboration. Even if equipped with the proper skills, the emergency manager simply may not know who appropriate partners are. 826 In late 2011, the Community and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI) in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">initiated pilot testin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing of its Community Resilience System and process. This is one of the first (and certain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inly the most ambitious) effort to implement a Whole Community approach in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the United States. This marks the culmin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ination of a four-year-long effort in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">involvin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing over 200 community leaders; federal, state, local, and tribal representatives; researchers; and members of the fin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inancial and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">insurance communities. It is already offerin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing some important “lessons learned” to emergency managers in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in terms of how to implement a Whole Community approach. In this chapter, we first describe what a Whole Community approach entails. We then in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">introduce the Community Resilience System (CRS) and process. The CRS process has been based both on lessons learned from previous disasters (e.g., Hurricane Katrin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ina) and on advice from community leaders. We describe in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in detail the first two steps, formin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the leadership team and assessin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the community. We then describe the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">initial pilot testin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing of the CRS. We close with some general guidance for emergency managers lookin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to implement a Whole Community approach in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in their own communities, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">includin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing some observations based on in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">initial pilot testin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing. WHOLE COMMUNITY APPROACHES Whole Community approaches to emergency management are already in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in use in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the United Kin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingdom, the Netherlands, and elsewhere.2 The basic premise behin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ind any Whole Community approach is relatively simple. If the whole community is goin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to be impacted by a disaster, then the whole community should be in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">involved in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to respond to and recover from disruptive events. As the United States has moved toward an “all-hazards”/“maximum of maximums” approach to emergency management plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, it has become in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increasin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingly clear that most local governments do not have the resources needed to both respond to and recover from disaster.3 By in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">involvin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing all sectors of the community in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, all of the resources that would be used for response and recovery in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the community—whether belongin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to the local government, nonprofit organizations, private busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness, or even in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">individuals and neighborhoods—can be used more efficiently and effectively.
CHAPTER 36 847 COLLABORATION NOT ISOLATION: A JOINT APPROACH TO BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND RESILIENCE Richard Stones CSyp FSyI High-profile terrorist events, dramatic disasters, and major in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">industrial accidents all focus the min" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ind in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">into thin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing that this is what all threats look like. The reality for the majority of busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inesses in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the UK, however, is very different; it is the most mundane of events, the accidents that happened because somebody forgot to do what their procedure told them to do, or because they thought they could bypass a policy and do somethin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing another way, that presents a more realistic risk. The one thin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing you can be sure of when operatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in this manner is that when it goes wrong, and it does, it costs money if you’re lucky and life if you’re not. The UK busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness population comprises 95 percent subject matter experts, a group for whom the luxury of the corporate security advisor, the dedicated risk manager, or the occupational health and safety manager are a mere aspiration. More often this is a function performed by some other member of the workforce, who probably pulls in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in this extra work at home as an addition to their day job. These are the people that owners trust and depend upon to protect their busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inesses, and it is down to the goodwill of the workers that this usually is the case. Is this good? Is it best practice and could it be done better? Yes and no. Yes, because these people are generally the more trusted members of your workforce; they care about the busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness and take pride in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the importance of their additional role But no, because it is not necessarily a best practice, and it could be done better—but for many busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inesses, it has to do. But also no, as in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in many cases, although well in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intentioned, these people are not adequately train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ined to the level necessary to protect the busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness; as people familiar with risk with recognise it is often the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">insignificant overlooked issues that result in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the major in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incidents. 848 The irony in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in all of this is that in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in many cases these SMEs are sometimes called upon by your busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness to support that last-min" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inute order that has just come in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in or they may be already supplyin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the most in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">insignificant of components that serve to complete your busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inesses product. They are in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">insignificant until they are not there. Then what? It is only when they are taken out by disaster, man-made or natural, that you, as bigger busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inesses, begin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in to consider the what-if factor, or as I like to call it the “WIF” (pronounced “wiff”): “What if” we had done this to prevent that? Events over the last decade have served to galvanise our thoughts to the real possibility, and consequence, of disaster, and yet we still see car production halted by one of the world’s largest car manufacturers as a result of their contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity strategy failin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to consider the potential loss of a supplier, or in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the UK, like all other countries, we regularly see busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inesses large and small bein" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing displaced and their function stoppin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing as a result of flood, fire, chemical spillages, and other unforeseen disasters. The problem, however, is, as mentioned, that these people are at the end of, or form an in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">integral part of, your supply chain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in. Have you considered this in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in your busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity plans? Before you all rush off to check, let me save you a job. You haven’t, or at least not in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the detail necessary to main" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in your own organisation’s functionality and contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity. Why? It’s simple really; the busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity plan didn’t require the people writin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing it to consider this possibility. Many will argue that I’m wrong and that this is an in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">integral part of the process of risk mitigation. So why, as the local copper, do I see displaced busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inesses struggle after an accidental fire, after a burglary, or the multitude of other in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incidents, not disasters, that disrupt normal workin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing? Ten years ago as an Actin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Inspector at a local police station in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in north Nottin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inghamshire I asked myself the very same question. My wife, a dentist, rang me to tell me that our dental practice in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in North Derbyshire had been broken in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">into. Several hours later, after beratin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing colleagues in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the neighbourin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing police force, I sat at my desk and considered the approach that I had taken and then thought about my own force. Were we any better? Probably not. Could we be? Without doubt. Are we now? Yes. Why? Collaboration, not isolation.
CHAPTER 2 21 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO SURFACE TRANSPORTATION: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURING PUBLIC PLACES Brian Michael Jenkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins Director of the National Transportation Security Center at the Min" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ineta Transportation Institute INTRODUCTION The discovery of notes in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in Osama bin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in Laden’s compound in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">indicatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing that the terrorist leader was contemplatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing attackin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the United States on the tenth anniversary of September 11 underscores the contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing terrorist threat to public surface transportation. Public surface transportation—train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins and stations, buses and bus depots, even groups of people waitin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing at bus stops—offers terrorists an attractive target: easy access and easy escape, concentrations of people in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in confin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ined environments that enable an attack to achieve the high body counts terrorists seek, and confin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ined environments that can enhance the effects of explosives and unconventional weapons. This poses enormous challenges for security. THE THREAT IS REAL The terrorist threat to public surface transportation is real. While terrorists remain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in obsessed with attackin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing commercial aviation, they regard surface transportation as a killin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing field. Between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2011, terrorists carried out 75 attacks on airlin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iners and airports worldwide, causin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing 157 deaths. Durin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the same period, terrorists carried out nearly 1,804 attacks on surface transportation, most of them again" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inst bus and train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in targets, killin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing more than 3,900 people. (This does not in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">include attacks in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in war zones like Afghanistan and Iraq.)1 22 While terrorists recently have attacked aviation targets less often, they have been attackin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing surface transportation more frequently. Between 1970 and 1979, terrorists carried out a total of 15 surface transportation attacks that caused fatalities. (Only in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incidents with fatalities are in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">included to avoid apparent in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increases that are due solely to better reportin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing.) The number grew to 43 attacks with fatalities in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the 1980s, 281 in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the 1990s, and 465 in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the decade between 2000 and 2009. Many of these attacks in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">involved a few fatalities and did not make headlin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine news, but 11 of them sin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ince 9/11 resulted in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in 50 or more deaths, and three of the attacks (in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">includin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing one carried out by a deranged arsonist) each killed nearly 200 people. The total number of fatalities in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in these 14 attacks is the approximate equivalent of the fatalities in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in seven major airlin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine crashes. One can imagin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine the furor that would have resulted if seven commercial airlin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iners had been brought down by terrorists after 9/11. The West is not immune. Most of the attacks have occurred in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in developin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing countries like India, but there have been attacks on train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins and buses in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in France, Spain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in, the United Kin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingdom, Russia, and Japan. Further terrorist plots again" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inst surface transportation targets have been uncovered and foiled in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the United Kin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingdom, Germany, Spain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in, Italy, and Australia. Attacks on surface transportation could also occur in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the United States. Sin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ince 9/11, there have been seven reported terrorist plots in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">involvin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing attacks on train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the United States. Authorities reportedly uncovered a plot in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in 2003 to release poison gas in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in New York’s subways. In 2004, New York police in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infiltrated a plot by two men to bomb a mid-Manhattan subway station. In 2006, a terrorist plot was uncovered in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in Lebanon to blow up train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in tunnels under the Hudson River. Bryant Vin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inas, a homegrown recruit to al Qaeda, offered terrorists his assistance in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in attackin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the Long Island Railroad where he once worked, and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in 2009, authorities uncovered a mature plot to bomb New York’s subways. Faisal Shazad, the Time Square bomber, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">initially planned to follow up that attack with a bombin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing at New York’s Grand Central Station. In 2010, Farooque Ahmed was arrested in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in an FBI stin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing operation for plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to bomb Washin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ington’s Metro stations.2
CHAPTER 15 323 THE NECESSITY OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION Steven Pugh Captain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in, United States Air Force INTRODUCTION One of the prin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incipal, and most accelerated, changes in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in recent U.S. history is the nation’s reliance on in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">information technology. Five decades ago, the impact of digital in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure on our way of life was essentially nonexistent. Today, the United States’ digital in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure has become a strategic national asset. Pundits have warned of adversarial hackers who could in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infiltrate and shutdown critical Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such as water treatment facilities, power grids, or even nuclear power stations—their warnin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ings are not without merit. A whole-of-government approach must be used to confront and thwart these new, advanced threats. The domain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in of cyberspace is unique for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) because it is the only main" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in mission area that is man-made. It is also the newest of the mission areas. Additionally, cyberspace enables or supports all other mission areas with which DHS has been charged. Another unique aspect is that cyberspace literally permeates all facets of the government, not just DHS. Because of this unique characteristic, the success of DHS is in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intimately tied with its ability and capacity to work effectively with other departments and agencies—known as in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interagency collaboration. In addition to the broad nature of cyberspace, the scope of knowledge required to secure and defend cyberspace, and the scale of the Internet, make developin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a solution challengin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing. Some of the problems within" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in cyberspace are simply too broad for one department to take on sin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inglehandedly. Fortunately, as Mr. Stanton from Johns- Hopkin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins University writes, “Cyberspace lends itself to such collaboration between government and private actors” (Stanton, 2008). To avert digital disaster, a comprehensive solution must be achieved. An attacker needs only one vulnerability to gain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in access to a digital network and wreck havoc. 324 In a fiscally constrain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ined environment, the nation needs to leverage as much efficiency as possible. Thomas Stanton writes, “Inter-agency collaboration, important before, has become essential for program managers. Agencies must begin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in to pool admin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inistrative resources to join" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intly enhance the quality of their programs” (Stanton, 2011). The idea of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interagency collaboration has a solid theoretical foundation, though its execution has a rather in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inconsistent record of accomplishment. The lessons of past failures can show us where an organization’s in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inability to work outside itself has led to unimagin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inable consequences, and yet we can easily poin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">int to overwhelmin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing success when agencies have utilized their in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">individual strengths by workin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing together. We can learn from these case studies and use them as models as we move forward as a successful nation. Knowledge sharin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing should be among the top priorities for the government when it comes to securin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing our digital in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure. Many of our adversaries use the same tools, tactics, and techniques to silently move through our networks; agencies need to share this data so we can present a solid, unified front in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the face of cyberspace adversaries. Additionally, protectin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing our digital in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure plays in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">into the larger strategy of cyberspace deterrence. The Department of Defense publicly declared, “Defendin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the homeland is an important part of deterrence” (Department of Defense, 2011). We can effectively deny, disrupt, and min" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inimize adversarial activity by securin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing our critical assets. These behaviors present a solid foundation that our government leaders rely on when discussin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing response actions towards an adversary for cyberspace aggression. The US commercial sector needs guidance on proper cyber-hygiene. Large companies can often afford to hire cyberspace security experts, but small busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inesses may not. Wars now target the will of a population in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in addition to military forces, and alterin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a person’s livelihood is a quick way to erode support of military action.
CHAPTER 20 437 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTERDEPENDENCY REVISITED Rae Zimmerman Professor of Plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and Public Admin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inistration Director, Institute for Civil Infrastructure Systems (ICIS) Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University Note: This work was origin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inally supported by several grants, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">includin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the National Science Foundation (NSF) Cooperative Agreement No. CMS–9728805 for the Institute for Civil Infrastructure Systems (ICIS) at New York University (in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in partnership with Cornell University, Polytechnic University of New York, and the University of Southern California); Urban Infrastructure in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in a Time of Crisis (grant number 0204660) and Brin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Information Technology to Infrastructure (grant number 0091482); and a grant from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through a subaward from the University of Southern California for the first Homeland Security Center of Excellence. The author’s opin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inions, fin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">indin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ings, and conclusions or recommendations are not necessarily those of NSF or DHS. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS SECURITY Infrastructure supports the economy, public health and welfare, and security in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in ways that are often difficult to ascertain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in. Interdependencies among in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructures and other activities magnify their contribution to these sectors both positively and negatively, and are of growin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing concern in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure security arena. The importance of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure is portrayed in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in a number of ways. One is the contribution of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure to the gross domestic product (GDP). An estimate by the World Bank is that the GDP in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increases 15 percent as in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure capital doubles.1 Given the difficulty of estimatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing specific social and economic contributions of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure, another overall way of assessin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing its contribution has been in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in terms of the value of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure assets. U.S. assets in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in 2009 were valued at several trillions of dollars directly for the utilities and transportation sectors alone and a larger amount if other related sectors are in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">included.2 These estimates of asset value or fin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inancial impacts may not take in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">into account dependencies and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interdependencies among in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure sectors and between these sectors and other parts of the economy, or at least do not make those relationships explicit. 438 The security of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure has become a major objective of national policy. Sin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ince the mid-1990s or earlier these policies have been reflected in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in regulations, guidelin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ines, executive orders, reports, legislation, plans, and strategies. Infrastructure security in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in general evolved out of earlier concerns over protectin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing communications. That theme contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inues to domin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inate in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure security policy, attain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing more promin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inence as cybersecurity has had in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increasin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing attention along with its in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increasin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interconnections with other in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructures. As a collection of activities and facilities, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure is complex, pervasive, and thus particularly open to terrorism. To make in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure secure, we need to understand its in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interdependencies and their relationship to in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure vulnerabilities. Defin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">initions: Infrastructure, Critical Infrastructure, and Interdependent Infrastructure The current term in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure is relatively new, datin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing from about the 1980s, and earlier, and the concept had to do main" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inly with military in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">installations and public works.3 In 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) adopted a defin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inition that refers to networks, processes, synergy, and contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity “to produce and distribute a contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuous flow of essential goods and services.”4 The concept of critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and its in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interdependencies with other sectors is even more recent than the concept of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure, and lin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inks in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and security. Both ideas followed a national emphasis on the performance of in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure to promote health, safety, and welfare. For example, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 defin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ined critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure as “those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the min" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inimum operations of the economy and government.”5 PDD 63 clearly acknowledged in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interdependence in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure sectors, emphasizin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">information technology and cybersecurity, and called for “a particular focus on in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interdependencies” in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the development of sector plans. Section 1016(e) of the Patriot Act of 2001 defin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ined critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the nation that the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incapacity or destruction of such systems would have a debilitatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing impact on security, national economic security, [or] national public health and safety or any combin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ination of these matters.”6 As policies regardin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure evolved, the scope of the concept evolved as well. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) of 2009 identified critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructures together with a broader set of sectors called critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) comprisin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing 18 sectors that in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">include “agriculture and food, defense in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">industrial base, energy, healthcare and public health, national monuments and icons, bankin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and fin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inance, water, chemical, commercial facilities, critical manufacturin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, dams, emergency services, nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">information technology, communications, postal and shippin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, transportation systems, and government facilities.”7 HSPD–7 provides the foundation for critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure protection, and the U.S. DHS authority to protect critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure origin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inates in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the Homeland Protection Act of 2002.8 The categories are similar to those used in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in lifelin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine engin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ineerin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, for example, which focuses on transmission and distribution systems.9 The contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing significance of critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure is reflected in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the annual designation by the President of the United States, sin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ince 2009, of December as Critical Infrastructure Month.
CHAPTER 31 743 ROLE OF CORPORATE SECURITY Ronald J. Kelly Director, IBM Corporate Security INTRODUCTION The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a watershed for the United States, for the relatives of the victims, for the admin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inistration, for ordin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inary citizens, for American corporations worldwide, and for the people who are responsible for developin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, implementin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, and main" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the security of corporate America. Time may not yet have healed the wounds of 9/11, but it is begin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">innin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to blur the sense of threat. Or perhaps there is a growin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing sense of security resultin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing from the frantic burst of government activity afterward. This response led to the wars in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in Afghanistan and Iraq; the commitment of American combat forces or special forces in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in North Africa, Central Asia, the Philippin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ines, and elsewhere; the PATRIOT Act; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the 9/11 Commission; a national ‘’in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intelligence czar’’; and a sense among the public that although law enforcement and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intelligence communities had failed, the problems were bein" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing fixed. There have been months of hearin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ings on what went wrong, who failed us, who is to blame. People have asked why the American in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intelligence community did not prevent the attacks, assumin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing simplistically that all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle were there, waitin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing for the CIA and FBI to communicate with each other and put them together. There has been broad support for hurriedly implementin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing all the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, although no one has satisfactorily explain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ined how the pieces of the puzzle would have come together if those recommendations had been in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in place before the attack. 744 There are many thin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ings that, as members of the public, we do not know and may not know for several years: whether the U.S. government departments reorganized under DHS are functionin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing better than they were beforehand; whether the country would have been better protected by a smaller, more selective reorganization; whether we should change, weaken, or strengthen the PATRIOT Act; whether the reorganization of the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intelligence community will make us safer. Also, many high-profile critics tell us that the steps the government has taken to protect the national in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure are not enough, that the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure is still vulnerable. (They are right, but why should we want to give that in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">information to our enemies?) Anyone who thin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inks seriously about this threat must conclude that there could be another terrorist attack at any time, with no warnin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, no chatter, no raisin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing of the alert level, no government announcement, and none of the commentary we normally receive from experts in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the media. The effort to carry the war to certain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in terrorists abroad was necessary and has been helpful; the arrests of many al-Qaida operatives worldwide may have delayed a follow-up attack on the United States. The work of the Join" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">int Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) has made it much more difficult for terrorists to recruit, organize, and put together an operation in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the United States without fear of detection and further arrests. However, there is nothin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to suggest that terrorists have given up. On the contrary, there is an ongoin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing barrage of threats again" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inst the West, and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">innumerable in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">individuals are willin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to sacrifice their lives in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in an attack on the United States. Preventin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing such an attack may be beyond the resources of federal, state, or local governments. There is a sayin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing: ‘’The government has to get it right 100 percent of the time; the enemy has to get it right just once.’’ Therefore, the government needs help. The private sector owns or operates more than 85 percent of the nation’s critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and thus should be in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the forefront of governmental efforts to protect the country. Corporations must play a significant role in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in reducin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the risk of an attack again" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inst the busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in preparin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing for the consequences of an attack if one occurs. Corporate America has to help turn soft targets in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">into tough targets and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increase its own survivability. Major corporations need to take the responsibility for developin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and implementin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing fundamental security practices, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">includin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing risk assessment, baselin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine security, emergency plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, crisis management, screenin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing of employees, and protectin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure. Corporations also need to examin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine their vulnerabilities, dependencies, and logistic needs and determin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ine how they will function if they are temporarily denied the use of certain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in assets. Most important, DHS needs to form an in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interactive partnership with the private sector.
CHAPTER 32 763 CORPORATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Donald L. Schmidt Emergency Response Plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing Practice Leader, Marsh Risk Consultin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing INTRODUCTION What Is Emergency Management? Many terms are used for emergency management in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the private sector: emergency response plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingency plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, crisis management, disaster plannin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing, etc. However, emergency management, the term used in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the public sector, is more in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inclusive and is becomin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increasin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingly popular in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the private sector. Emergency management has four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Sin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ince September 11, 2001 one more phase has emerged from mitigation: prevention or deterrence. Emergency management begin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ins with mitigation—identifyin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a threat; assessin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing its potential impact on people, facilities, operations, and the environment; and takin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing steps to reduce the probability of occurrence or the severity of consequences. Preparedness in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">involves organizin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and train" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing people, providin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing facilities and equipment, and developin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing policies and procedures for respondin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing. The response phase in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">includes actions taken to safeguard people and stabilize the in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incident. In the private sector, recovery in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">includes contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity of critical busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness functions, addressed in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity plans, and disaster recovery. Crisis management is an overarchin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing executive-level plan that in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">includes makin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing strategic decisions; communicatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing with stakeholders such as employees, stockholders, customers, and suppliers; and addressin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the emotional needs and health care of affected employees and their families, i.e., the human impact. 764 National Preparedness Standard: NFPA 1600 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) reviewed the need for preparedness in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the private sector and noted in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in Chapter 12 of its report:1 ‘’the private sector controls 85 percent of the critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the nation [and] the ‘first’ first responders will almost certain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inly be civilians.’’ The commission acknowledged that lack of a standard contributed to lack of preparedness. It asked the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to develop a standard for the private sector. After a series of workshops that in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">included representatives from many private-sector in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">industries and associations as well as public officials, ANSI’s Homeland Security Standards Panel endorsed NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness Contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity Programs.2 NFPA 1600—on which this chapter is based—was promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) under the consensus-based process of standards development accredited by ANSI and established common criteria for emergency management and busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity. Congress then acted on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incorporated Section 7305, Private Sector Preparedness, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">into the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, Title VII—Implementation of 9/11 Commission Recommendations. The Act, signed in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">into Law by President Bush on December 17, 2004, recognizes NFPA 1600, Disaster/Emergency Management and Busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness Contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity Programs, as our national preparedness standard. (a) FINDINGS.—Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the followin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing fin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">indin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ings: (1) Private sector organizations own 85 percent of the Nation’s critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure and employ the vast majority of the Nation’s workers. (2) Preparedness in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the private sector and public sector for rescue, restart and recovery of operations should in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">include, as appropriate— (A) a plan for evacuation; (B) adequate communications capabilities; and (C) a plan for contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity of operations. (3) The American National Standards Institute recommends a voluntary national preparedness standard for the private sector based on the existin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing American National Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness Contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity Programs (NFPA 1600), with appropriate modifications. This standard establishes a common set of criteria and termin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inology for preparedness, disaster management, emergency management, and busin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">iness contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity programs.
CHAPTER 34 811 BUILDING A RESILIENT NATION Stephen Flynn Co-Director of the Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security; and Professor of Political Science at Northeastern University Sean Burke Associate Director of the Kostas Research Institute Assurin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing security, safety, and prosperity in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the twenty-first century requires buildin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and main" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing resilience in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the face of chronic and catastrophic risks. Americans must brace themselves in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the years ahead for large-scale disruptions, fueled by unconventional conflict around the globe, changes in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in climate, and the sheer complexity and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interdependencies of transnational modern systems and networks. Ensurin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing that in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">individuals, communities, and critical in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure have the capacity to withstand, respond to, rapidly recover from, and adapt to man-made and natural disturbances will prove in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">indispensible to sustain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing our way of life and quality of life. Alternatively, a lack of resilience will be a competitive disadvantage, with in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">individuals and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">investors avoidin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing places and companies that cannot provide contin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inuity of essential services in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the face of stress. Moreover, resilience provides deterrence value to adversaries whose aim is mass disruption or destruction, as attempts to target resilient societies or systems will gain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in little return for their nefarious efforts. Buildin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing resilience requires a strategy for harnessin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing America’s greatest assets: civil society and the private sector. To accomplish this, Washin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ington must revisit the approach it adopted after the attacks of September 11 that has in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increasin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingly mired federal law enforcement, border, and transportation agencies in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in a Cold War-era legacy system of classified documents and security clearances. Security officials blocked from sharin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">information on threats and vulnerabilities with the public will only grow in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">increasin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ingly isolated from those to which they are responsible. Barriers to adequately in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">informin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and empowerin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing civil society must be removed. In the end, only a well-in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">informed citizenry can effectively defend the nation from the diverse range of risks to the homeland. 812 Buildin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing resilience also requires that the government not promise more protection and assistance than it can deliver. The in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">indisputable fact is that there never will be enough professionals at the right place at the right time when terrorists or disasters strike. Intelligence and technologies are fallible, and the forces of nature cannot be deterred. Experience has shown time and again" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in that when it comes to detectin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">interceptin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing terrorist activities or dealin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing with a catastrophic natural event, the first preventers and first responders will almost always be civilians and system operators who by circumstance fin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ind themselves unwittin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing targets of terrorists or in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in the path of a disaster when it strikes. Importantly, in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in order to better develop the nation’s capacity to manage danger and disasters, the government must be careful to not end up alienatin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the people they are workin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing to protect. Advancin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing security measures without spellin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing out the vulnerability they were designed to address can lead to a resentful and uncooperative public. This anger and skepticism will in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in turn impede future government efforts to improve security. Forcin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing the public to accept a safety or security measure without fully explain" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing why it is necessary and what it is supposed to accomplish is exactly the wrong way to build the trust necessary for long-term success. The public sector needs to look at the private sector and everyday people not as potential victims to be protected, but as essential allies whose active collaboration is in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">indispensible to buildin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing a more resilient society. If there is one lesson to take away from the twentieth century it is that it is both futile and counterproductive to pursue safety and security efforts with the avowed aim to elimin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inate risks. While risks can and should be mitigated, it gets exponentially more expensive and difficult to try and reduce those risks to zero. Not only will those efforts face the law of dimin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">inishin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">ing returns, they will also in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">invariably generate unin" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">intended consequences. Instead, the goal must be to develop policies and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">incentives that encourage resilience at the community level, and within" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in and across networks and in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">in" rel="nofollow">infrastructure sectors locally, regionally, and nationally.