Daniel C. Dennett, “The Origins of Selves”

From where do ‘I’ come? Unlike the other authors that you have read over the past few weeks, Dennett gives attempts to give a strictly empirical account of ‘self’. For Daniel Dennett, accountin" rel="nofollow">ing for phenomena (objects or events experienced in" rel="nofollow">in reality) is a matter of reduction to natural facts. When philosophers say all experience in" rel="nofollow">in reality is reducible to physical facts, we say that this is a physicalist account of the world. Dennett’s particular lin" rel="nofollow">ine of reasonin" rel="nofollow">ing is an extreme form of physicalism, where if there is some phenomena that cannot be accounted without appealin" rel="nofollow">ing to non-physical facts, then it stands to reason that the phenomena in" rel="nofollow">in question does not exist (or that it has been accounted for it in" rel="nofollow">incorrectly.) Hence, Dennett’s position in" rel="nofollow">in the philosophy of min" rel="nofollow">ind and cognitive science is what is known as material elimin" rel="nofollow">inativism. However, Dennett’s account approaches the notion of self from a perspective of evolutionary biology, and Dennett believes that an account of the self can be given in" rel="nofollow">in a way that develops from physical facts. First, briefly lay out Dennett’s account of the self as it constructed through a narrative. What might this narrative structure mean for a person that has multiple personality disorder? Second, give a brief comparison with James Giles ‘no-self theory’ that you read last week. Fin" rel="nofollow">inally, and followin" rel="nofollow">ing from your responses to the two previous questions, should a person prefer Giles’ or Dennett’s account of the self? Provide reasons for your decision and list some possible advantages, and disadvantages, of your choice.