David Hume’s exploration of morality in his writings, particularly in the excerpts discussing “Ethical Matters and Matters of Fact,” presents a nuanced view of the relationship between human emotions, reason, and ethical considerations. Below are responses to the three questions based on Hume’s arguments.

1. Hume’s Use of Animal Incest to Advance His Argument

Hume uses the example of animal incest to illustrate that morality cannot be reduced to mere facts or rational deductions. He points out that while incest might be a “matter of fact” in the animal kingdom, it does not imply that it is morally acceptable for humans. Hume argues that certain behaviors may be factually present in nature (such as animals mating with close relatives), but this does not provide a moral justification or dictate what humans ought to do.

Instead, Hume emphasizes that morality involves more than just empirical observations; it requires an engagement with feelings and sentiments. He suggests that our moral judgments are informed by our emotional responses rather than purely logical reasoning. In this way, he seeks to demonstrate that morality is grounded in human sentiments and cannot simply be derived from factual statements about the world.

2. Hume’s Idea That Morality Is a Matter of Feelings and Sentiments

Hume posits that morality is fundamentally rooted in human feelings and sentiments rather than in rational thought or objective truths. He believes that our moral judgments arise from our emotional responses to situations, which are shaped by our experiences, social interactions, and innate feelings of approval or disapproval.

For Hume, moral sentiments are universal feelings that guide human behavior and ethical decision-making. He argues that when we perceive actions as virtuous or vicious, it is because they evoke specific emotional reactions within us—such as feelings of compassion or outrage. Thus, moral principles are not abstract rational constructs but rather reflections of our emotional lives. Hume’s focus on feelings suggests that morality is inherently subjective, varying from person to person based on individual sentiments.

3. Hume’s Problem with Deducing an Ought from an Is

Hume famously raises the issue of deriving “ought” statements from “is” statements—known as the “is-ought problem.” He argues that observational facts about the world (what “is”) cannot dictate moral imperatives (what “ought” to be). For example, one can observe behaviors in nature or society, but these observations do not inherently provide a basis for ethical conclusions.

Hume asserts that reason alone cannot motivate action or establish moral norms; it is feelings that instill a sense of obligation or duty. Therefore, attempting to derive ethical mandates solely from factual descriptions leads to a logical gap. Hume’s critique highlights that while we can describe the world and human behavior, we must rely on sentiments to inform our moral judgments and obligations. In essence, Hume contends that any transition from descriptive statements about the world to prescriptive moral claims requires an additional normative foundation rooted in human emotions and societal values.

In summary, Hume’s arguments emphasize the importance of sentiment in moral philosophy and challenge the notion that objective reasoning alone can dictate ethical principles. His insights remain influential in contemporary discussions about the nature of morality and its foundations in human experience.