Protect DoD and public networks from Russian misinformation attacks

        1) 01: Giannetti, in his article "A Duty to Warn" claims U.S. Air Force cyber, intelligence, and counter-intelligence professionals are bound to protect Department of Defense and public networks from the spread of "corrosive" Russian disinformation. The author recommends the Air Force use social media to simply "flag" pernicious content to avoid the United States' "collective consciousness" from being "poisoned?" Should the service involve itself in this way? Why or why not? 2)02: Should a counter-disinformation task force be a purely Air Force-led endeavor (led by AFOSI and/or 24th Air Force)? Or, would it be better suited to supporting a federally organized unit, like a cyber JTTF for this matter? Why? Fully support your answer with historical examples from the article or other external sources.