The follow
ing post has two assignments namely;
1.Recommended Performance Management System
Develop an appropriate performance management system for your organization. Include
strategies and general considerations, design, implementation, and evaluation as well as justification/rationale for your recommendations
2.Human Dimensions of Global Forests
1. High Park
in Toronto is famous for its Cherry bloom dur
ing the spr
ing season. Lots of people from Greater Toronto area visit the park dur
ing the one week period of Cherry bloom. Parks, Forestry and Recreation department of the City of Toronto appo
inted you as consultant to estimate the economic value of Cherry bloom to the society. They want to conv
ince the Mayor to
increase their budgetary allocation to ma
inta
in the park. The authorities provided you follow
ing data about the number of visitors com
ing to park from different zones around the park dur
ing one week period
in May 2016.
Zone Zone Population Total visits dur
ing
the week Visits per thousand of
Population Cost of travel
(To and fro)
0 100000 2000 20 0
1 400000 6800 17 5
2 500000 6500 13 10
3 500000 4000 8 15
4 500000 1000 2 20
Beyond 4 0 0
Total visits 20,300
a. Assume that people liv
ing
in all the zones are similar
in taste and
income, and also that they would respond to the
introduction of entry fee to the park
in the same manner as they respond to
increase
in travel cost. Calculate the total economic benefit provided by the Cherry bloom to the society
in one week us
ing the zonal travel cost method. [5 x 6 = 30]
i. Calculate the total number of visits to the Park by
introduc
ing $5 entry fee. ii. Calculate the total number of visits to the Park by
introduc
ing $10 entry fee.
iii. Calculate the total number of visits to the Park by
introduc
ing $15 entry fee. iv. Calculate the total number of visits to the Park by
introduc
ing $20 entry fee. v. Draw the site demand curve us
ing the result of (i.) to (iv.) above.
vi. F
ind the area below the site demand curve to f
ind out the economic benefit.
b. Park authorities are mull
ing to
introduce some k
ind of entry fee to the park dur
ing the bloom period. What entry fee would you recommend so that park authorities maximize the revenue? [10]
2. Expla
in the concept of ord
inal utility. In the fuelwood collection game that we discussed
in the class, assume that farmers have social preference (i.e. they care about other farmer(s), value the growth
in their forest, follow the norms that lead to susta
inability etc.). Specifically assume that their preferences over action profile is as below:
Farmer-1: (Sus, Sus) ? (Sus, Unsus) ? (Unsus, Unsus) ? (Unsus, Sus)
Farmer-2: (Sus, Sus) ? (Unsus, Sus) ? (Unsus, Unsus) ? (Sus, Unsus)
a. Us
ing the concept of ord
inal utility, assign appropriate numbers to the utilities of the farmers over the action profile. [4]
b. Represent the situation as a strategic game
in a table and f
ind the Nash equilibrium(s). [6]
3. Two farmers liv
ing
in a village have just planted Teak plants
in a nearby bare forest plot. They must protect their plantation from the damage by wild boars
in the night. Wild boars come from two different sides of the plantation from the nearby forests. To protect the plantation, they both must guard the plantation from two different sides stay
ing up whole nights. If any one of them betrays and goes to sleep, the plantation will be destroyed forever. Consider that both the farmers are similar
in their preferences over the success of plantation and sleep
ing. They both get a utility of 4 units if plantation is saved — (they can sell the mature teak
in the market after some years and earn money). They both get utility of 2 units from hav
ing a good night’s sleep
in their cozy beds, irrespective of whether other person guards the forest or sleeps. A farmer, however, gets a utility of 0 units when he guards the one end entire night sacrific
ing his sleep, while his friend sleeps and consequently plantation is destroyed by the wild boars from the other end.
a. Assum
ing that each farmer has two actions to choose from— ‘Guard’ or ‘Sleep’, model the situation as a strategic game. Specifically, draw a 2 x 2 table show
ing the payoff of each farmer over the action profiles. [10]
b. What is (are) the equilibrium(s) of this game? [10]
c. Which action is riskier of the two — ‘Guard’ or ‘Sleep’? (Risky action here means the action which may result
in more loss of utility, if other person betrays.) [6]
d. Which action the farmers are likely to choose, if there is lack of assurance from either side? [4] Can you see why it is difficult to unite people for a public cause, if there is atmosphere of distrust?
4. Assume that two countries Canada and Ch
ina produce just two goods— particle board, plywood sheets—
in their economies. Also assume that there is no currency
in the system and countries, if will
ing to trade, just exchange the two goods. The only
input be
ing used
in the production of the goods is the Labour. Canada can produce 10 particle boards or
25 plywood sheets
in 100 hours. Ch
ina can produce 20 particle boards or 50 plywood sheets
in 100 hours. [5 + 5 + 10 = 20]
a. Does any country have absolute advantage
in the production of the goods?
b. Does any country have the comparative advantage
in produc
ing the particle boards? c. Does there exist a feasible exchange rate between particle board and plywood sheet (tonnes particle board / tonnes plywood sheet)? If yes, show that if countries specialize and trade at this exchange