- Introduction
1.1. Context of the Policy Problem
Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has posed a threat to the United Arab Emirates. Previously, the UAE historically struggled with Iran due to its occupation of the three islands. Since 1979, Iran has played an aggressive role in the Strait of Hormuz (Carl 2020). Recently, Iran has signed a new strategic agreement with China which will last for approximately 25 years. The partnership between the UAE, the GCC and the US deters Iran from taking overtly hostile action, so Iran is trying to secure Chinese diplomatic support in the United Nations Security Council. Teheran also seeks external financing to develop its oil fields and overcome US economic sanctions. This new agreement between Iran and China may embolden Iran to put more pressure on the UAE (Zhang 2020).
1.2. Definition of the Policy Problem
This capstone focuses on the implications of the new Iran - China agreement for the UAE’s national security, and thus requires a thorough analysis of the Iranian political role in Arab and Muslim countries in tandem with the Chinese and Russian political interests in the Middle East in order to calibrate the threats this agreement poses to UAE national security in particular and wider policy options needed to respond to these dangers to UAE national interests.
1.3. Purpose of the Policy Paper
The aim of this paper is to study the published secondary material on the Iranian threats to the national security of UAE, GCC countries, and the international security in general and with regard to the Iran - China Agreement in particular. Then, it analyses the scope of this situation and its urgency for UAE policy makers.
1.4. Methodology:
In this paper, it is necessary to conduct a critical literature review of recent publications on the agreement between Iran and China. Furthermore, it will analyse the historical relations between the UAE and Iran through the available published sources. This capstone will use a qualitative analysis methodology to identify how this Iran - China relationship represents a threat to the UAE. The project will propose certain policy options and end up with conclusions and recommendations for policy makers to consider and implement accordingly.
1.5. Limitations of the Study
This paper is dealing with a new agreement which is just one year old. So, there are few relevant references which directly analyse this Iran - China agreement. Instead, this paper will examine the available journal articles and recent research in addition to references which handle the known problems and disputes between Iran and the UAE in order to be able to evaluate the current situation clearly. Moreover, the articles consulted about the 25-years agreement have only been recently published. In addition, the original document of the agreement between Iran and China is written in Farsi, and no translation is available for the main details of this agreement document. Therefore, it is not possible to see its full terms and implications (Akbarzadeh 2020). - Problem Description
2.1. Background of the Problem
As a background to the original threats of Iran, as demonstrated in 1971, when the British withdrew from the Arabian Gulf after having had control for more than a century, international powers watched the dramatic events unfold. The British administered the seven sheikhdoms, known as the Trucial States which became a new and completely independent federal state known as United Arab Emirates on 2 December 1971 (Henderson 2017).
The strategic location of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands, which had been occupied by Iran on 30 November 1971 after the withdrawal of British forces, is considered of strategic significance not only to the UAE and Iran but also for the stability of the region, in general, and the oil market and the national and international security interests of these countries, the US and their alliances (Al-Mazrouei 2015, 3-4).
After the 1979 revolution, Iran, in an attempt to control the Strait of Hormuz, sent a threatening messages to the USA and Arabian Gulf countries that Iran was a strong country capable of waging wars and confronting the world. During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, both Iran and Iraq targeted tankers and merchant ships in the Gulf, which brought the United States into the conflict. Iran learned lessons from that time, which became known as the ‘Tanker War’, and now has many more weapons at its disposal such as mines and speedboats to block the Strait of Hormuz, military analysts claim (Reuters 2020).
Since the Iran-Iraq war, the United States has maintained a significant security presence in the Gulf to maintain the security of the Strait of Hormuz. As an alternative to the US security umbrella, China nowadays is considering a broadening of security arrangements in the Gulf region with the backing of Russia, based on a collective security concept (Ali 2020). In the past decade, China has significantly increased its political, economic and security footprint in the Middle East, specifically in the Arabian Gulf, becoming the biggest trading partner and external investor for many countries in the region. China’s growing economic presence is sure to expand to wider engagement with the Gulf region after Beijing’s agreement with Iran, thus increasing China’s influence on regional stability and political dynamics, especially in relation to issues such as surveillance technology and arms sales (Lons 2019).
Former US President Donald Trump waged a campaign of ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran’s economy which started in 2018, threatening to impose sanctions on countries in Europe and elsewhere that bought Iranian oil or traded with the Islamic Republic. Mr Trump claimed that this would help to “eliminate the threat of Iran’s ballistic missile program; to stop its terrorist activities worldwide; and to block its menacing activity across the Middle East” (Slavin 2018). American sanctions have yet to achieve these desired objectives but they have pushed Iran deeper into recession. As a consequence, Tehran sees its new agreement with China as a way to extract more from a relationship that has so far entailed only “lukewarm” commitment (Campbell 2020).
On top of the US sanctions, Iran has been battered by low oil prices, the worst Covid-19 outbreak in the Middle East, the downing of a Ukrainian Flight 752 airliner, and waves of protests which have heaped further strain on Iran’s economy. The new agreement may allow Iran to increase its economic growth. This may lead to more Iranian support to the terrorist organizations and militants groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen which will have implications for the UAE’s national security and the instability of the region.
There are many strategic implications of the 25-year agreement between Iran and China. Economy-wise, this agreement provides Iran with unlimited funding starting with $400 billion from China for Iran’s government to spend on various industries, including major intelligence gathering. Other outcomes include Chinese ships accessing Iranian ports, 5,000 Chinese military and security personnel in Iran, and their new joint military, nuclear weapons and oil partnerships (Farnaz Fassihi 2020). The new agreement may also enable Iran to obtain modern weapons which could lead to more aggression in the region. Furthermore in the strategic realm, the agreement proposes draft talks about deepening military cooperation, with “joint training and exercises”, “joint research and weapons development”, and intelligence sharing (SHUKLA 2020). In addition, Iran will pose a greater threat over the Strait of Hormuz which may impact the UAE’s economy. Based on the analysis of recent research on Iran’s relations with China, this paper will identify how this relationship poses a national security threat to the UAE. Then it will recommend policies through which the UAE can counter this threat..
2.2. Problem with the Current Policy Environment
Iran has repeatedly taken rash, provocative actions that threaten international security in general and the Arabian Gulf security in particular. Through these confrontational events, Iran is seeking to raise the frequency of threats in the region. For example, on Sunday, May 12, 2019 four commercial ships near Fujairah "were subjected to sabotage operations" by Iran and its allies in Yemen (Gambrell 2019). Although, Iran had already denied any role or responsibility for this attack, it was clear to international military observers that this was Iran’s way to deflect responsibility. Secondly, on 14 September 2019, a major Saudi oil processing plant, known as Abqaiq, was attacked by a series of explosions from Houthi rebels in Yemen who are proxies directly supported by the Iranian regime (Brumfiel 2019). Thirdly, on December 14, 2020 oil tankers were attacked by a bomb-laden boat in Jeddah. Finally, there have been street protests in Iran against the UAE’s Abraham Accords agreement to normalize relations with Israel.
President Hassan Rouhani said a "great mistake" had been made by the UAE and faced what he called “treason” and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has declared its readiness to assault Dubai and Haifa towns, as well as to strike US territories if Washington chooses to respond (Times 2020).
Currently, Iran is a direct threat to the Arabian Gulf countries, specifically the UAE, for several reasons. Firstly, the imposed harsher US sanctions have made Iran suffer a major economic setbacks and internal problems – causing Teheran to look for strong partners, such as Russia, China, for support. Secondly, nowadays, Iran considers the UAE to be one of its main regional enemies, alongside Saudi Arabia, because it is blocking Teheran’s arms shipments in Yemen and Arabian Gulf countries through a strong Emirati-Saudi alliance that has been able to limit Iran's expansion in the region. Thirdly, Russia and China are openly supporting Iran by blocking a US bid to extend a weapons ban on Iran (Michelle Nichols 2020).
Furthermore, the potential consequences of the Iranian - Chinese agreement for UAE’s national security are that the agreement will help Iran overcome its economic collapse and thus enable Teheran to give even more support to its proxies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine by pumping more money and transferring technology and weapons. All these activities threaten the national security of the UAE, the Gulf states and the world more generally. In addition, the Iran – China agreement will eventually enable Iran to develop its weapons capabilities, especially its drone technology, which has been used before against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. Most worryingly of all, Teheran can embark on intensively developing its nuclear weapons programs that will undermine regional and global security since Iran is a pariah state that does not seek peaceful co-existence and tolerance in the regional and wider international context (Irish 2017).
A research paper published in January 2020 under the title “Small states and strategic hedging: the United Arab Emirates’ policy towards Iran” (Ayman El-Dessouki 2020) indicates that the UAE has made major changes since its establishment in 1971 with regard to its strategy towards Iran. According to the balance of power theory, the UAE, motivated by its desire for survival and security, will develop and implement military capabilities and hard-power mechanisms to force Iran to stop any potential threat to the UAE. In addition to improving its military capabilities and maintaining military security partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the USA, the UAE has enabled strategic hedging, while expanding its commercial and diplomatic links with Iran. However, as a result of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the UAE began reshaping its policy towards Iran by implementing certain aspects of a hard balancing strategy. - Policy Options
3.1. Framework of Analysis
The UAE has already entertained a number of solutions for the UAE-Iran problem. This paper proposes three policy options to try to resolve the problem. In addition, these options offer some future suggestions which can influence the relations with Iran.
Policy Option One: Countering Iran through stronger ties with the US, the EU and the GCC
The UAE could look into building stronger ties with the US, EU and GCC, by giving US and European military forces additional basing rights in the UAE, and by encouraging GCC military cooperation. As for US-UAE military relations, the UAE may seek to build up new training programs and enhance military capabilities, as well as, exchanging experience with the US army in both offensive and defensive doctrinal developments. The UAE may also become stakeholders with future joint US-UAE military projects. On the economic aspect, the UAE should offer incentives for UAE private organizations to increase trade cooperation with US-based companies, and increase marketing for FDI with the US. The UAE should seek new direct trade agreements with the US. Also, the UAE should encourage the incoming Biden administration to maintain sanctions against Iran. The UAE should enhance its diplomatic relations with the US.
With the EU, the UAE may work to enhance the military cooperation and defence projects, and exchange military experts through joint exercises and trainings. Economically, the UAE should try to find more trade agreements especially on the oil and gas sector with the EU. In addition, the UAE should promote more cooperation agreements and establishing a EU-GCC free trade agreement (FTA). With the GCC, the UAE should enhance cooperation by increasing military training and informational exchanges. All of these agreements and cooperation will support the UAE to counter the Iranian threat in the region. As evidence, Ukraine tried to create its own position for sovereignty over its land and keeping national security by seeking close relations to the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), so Ukraine could counter the Russian threat by enhancing its military and economy relations (Masters 2020).
Policy Option Two: Strengthening UAE ties with China
In fact, the UAE has sound relations with China, but it is in the economic aspect. The UAE is considered the most important trading hub in the Middle East region. The UAE might enhance its military ties with China by importing the newest military equipment, exchanging the military experiences, and sharing the newest military technological industries. In addition to the military cooperation, the UAE may benefit from the space technologies of China; especially since the UAE started its space exploration program in 2020.
On the economic aspect, the UAE may offer more incentives for the private sector to attract direct businesses from China, and increase trade agreements and economic investments in order to influence the Chinese government’s approach towards Iran and to put pressure on Iran to stop its belligerence in the region. Also, on the diplomatic front, the UAE should balance bilateral relations between its ties with the West and with China to gain more traction to decrease the Chinese presence in Iran. As evidence, in 1996, the Shanghai Five consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, allied together to resist US dominance in the Asian region through their military and economic relations, and they could oppose the US intervention in their affairs (Gill 2001).
Policy Option Three: Seeking better relations with Iran
As for the diplomatic instrument of state power, the UAE may seek to sign formal peace agreements with Iran and enhance possible diplomatic cooperation. Also, the UAE MoFAIC may increase the number of its diplomatic missions in Iran. Through economic cooperation, the UAE should promote its foreign relations with Iran to increase trade between the two countries. The UAE should seek more FDI in Iran and sign new trade agreements especially with the public sector in order to decrease the Iranian threat over the UAE and the region. The UAE should increase economic assistances and aids to Iran in order to influence the Iranian public opinion. As evidence, the UAE could achieve many trade agreements and economic cooperation with Israel in a short time after signing the normalization agreements at the end of 2020 (Yoel Guzansky 2020).
3.2. Evaluation of Policy Alternatives ( every option is 600 words min) (each option contains the way it works to be implemented and mention is advantages and disadvantages of each option with cost and risk) ( each option should be supported by evidence) (options must be visible, actionable and measurable)
- Conclusion and Recommendations (1200 words)
4.1. Synthesis of major findings
4.2. Set of policy recommendations ( try to join option 1 and 2 as recommended options)
4.3. Concluding remarks
This draft provides a good explanation of your policy problem, and you have identified three distinct policy options to address it. Your explanation of these options could be clearer, and I have identified a few places where you might provide additional detail in your next draft.
Your primary task in the next draft, will be to evaluate these policy options. Your evaluation of each option should explain:
1) Why might this option work?
2) What are the potential risks associated with the option? In other words, why might it fail?
For example, your second option, which involves stronger relations with China, might enable the UAE to have greater influence over the Chinese government, diminishing China’s support for Iran. But establishing stronger security ties with China might harm the UAE’s relationship with the US. Can you imagine the US agreeing to sell F-35s to the UAE if the US government feared that Chinese military personnel might gain access to the technology?
Your evaluation should conclude by explaining which option, or combination of options, will best address your policy problem.
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Sample Solution