Abstract
Amidst the controversial September, 24rd 2015 opening of Moscow’s largest
Mosque, Vladimir Putin made a public appearance in support of the Mosque despite
over 51% of his Muscovite constituents opposing the construction of the Mosque.
This moment represents what has been a shift in the Russian government’s
treatment of Muslims and reflects growing fears about extremist activity. Though
they account for 16% of Moscow’s population with over 2 million residents—one of
Europe’s largest concentrations—Muslims in Russia have been the object of
rampant xenophobia. The new Mosque is now only 1 of 4 in the entire city.
To consolidate a new Russian identity in the post-Soviet era the government
asserted the position of the Russian Orthodox Church, which grew from being the
official church of 31% of Russians in 1991 to 72% of Russians in 2008. Part of this
new identity was centered on trying to create a “Christian” Russia, whose more
conservative than many of the nation’s smaller religious groups and who does not
share many similarities to Islamic culture.
As extremist movements have developed, largely in Chechnya, Russia has
been learning to take a softer approach to Islam—encouraging it to follow the
channels of the state-sponsored Council of Muftis whose less extremist brand of
Islam poses less of a threat to Russian nationalism. The opening of the Mosque, now
Moscow’s largest, represents just one of many actions telling of the Russian
government’s need to be more inclusive lest they sow the seeds of extremist
violence.
Outline
I. Introduction
a. Why, despite appealing to his electorate with an allegiance to Russian
orthodoxy and having historically been so anti-Islam, has Vladimir
Putin so publicly endorsed the opening of an unpopular mosque in
Russia’s largest city?
i. 51% of Moscow citizens oppose the Mosque’s opening
(MacFarquhar)
ii. The Kremlin has explicitly maintained that Muslim’s are likely
to support radical political change, and has only allowed 4
Mosque’s to be open in the city.
- Chechnya is been experiencing Wahhabi-inspired
extremist violence, the Kremlin fears losing control of
the region (Nemstova).
b. In this paper, I will assert that the Russsian government, as embodied
by the actions of Vladimir Putin, is reversing it’s traditionally-harsh
treatment of Muslims in an attempt to make less attractive the
extremism plaguing the region.
II. The Puzzle
a. Only 4% of Moscow’s population approved of opening the Mosque,
despite the city boasting only 4 Mosque’s for the 2 million Muslim’s
who live there (MacFarquhar).
i. 51% of residents opposed it’s opening.
b. The opposition was largely spearheaded by the Russian Orthodox
Church within the city (MacFarquhar).
i. Currently, 72% of Russians are member of the Russian
Orthodox Church (Michelson).
ii. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Government
used the church to create a sense of National, Russian Identity. - Many Muslim ideals conflict with those that are
traditionally Muslim.
a. Traditionally, Muslims disapprove of the
consumption of alcohol which is a large part of
Russian culture.
b. Polygamy, much like gay marriage, is strictly
forbidden in Russian Orthodoxy and the public
overwhelmingly disapproves of it (Ioffe).
i. In Chechnya, Muslims have been allowed
to practice polygamy so long as they
remain loyal to Moscow—despite public
outcry over the practice.
c. Historically, the Soviet Union officially condemned Islam as an atheist
state, but also as a state whose ideology conflicted with Islam
(Michelson).
i. Those all religion was banned in the republic, Russian
Orthodoxy was less harmful to the Communist state. - Islam philosophically asserts that Sharia is the only
valid law, while Communism as a movement denounced
all faiths as false-consciousness.
a. This is the root of anti-Islamic sentiment within
the nation.
d. Many of Russia’s historical wars have been packaged and sold to the
Russian people as necessary to fight, “infidel” faiths in other lands
(Michelson).
i. Much of Russia’s cultural heritage is rooted in strongly
Christian thinking—writer’s such as Dostoevsky and Tolstoy
exemplify this.
e. Why would Putin anger his constituency by making this appearance
when the culture, history, and politics of Russia are so flagrantly antiIslam?
III. The State Sponsored Mosque
a. The Kremlin has spent over $300 million to build Islamic universities
to train officially-sanctioned Imams (Nemstova).
i. Within the nation, Sufism is the dominant form of Islam—one
that does not align with the more extreme branches of the
faith.
ii. These Imams are trained to spread Sufism, and to teach
nonviolence. - State spending on Muslim universities highlights the
degree to which the state controls the rhetoric of Sufi
Imams—showing even that they have created and
official, state-sanctioned brand of Islam.
a. This state-sanctioned church is controlled by the
Council of Muftis
IV. Russia’s Rough Hand Created and Extremism Problem
a. Previously, the Kremlin took the view that extremism was a problem
of outside influence being imposed on Russian Muslims (Nemstova,
Fagan).
i. The solution then, was to curb extremism abroad and it’s
ability to infiltrate Russian society. - This proved to be wrong.
b. The first and second Chechen wars were very brutal, and deadly.
i. Initially, resitance to Russian rule in Chechnya was based
around nationalist impulses—the desire for autonomy (Fagan). - After suffering defeat, religion became an ideal to bind
together the remaining resistance groups.
a. By the second Chechen war, Islamic fighters who
embraced a more radicalized strain of Islam
waged a war against the Russians.
i. These groups engage in acts of terrorism,
and continue to do so in regions outside
of Chechnya
V. Modern Chechnya, and Russia’s Modern Solution to Extremism
a. It became apparent after the Chechen wars had ended that they were
not fighting a group bound together by nationalism, but now instead
by their faith (Fagan).
i. Historically, Sufism had not violently opposed Russia—but
Wahhabi-branded Islam had (Kemper). - This strand of Islam was allowed to spread through
Chechnya after the wars (Wiktorowicz).
ii. Ramzan Kadyrov was installed in Chechnya as a ruler—he is a
warlord and Imam who semi-autonomously governs the region
(Ioffe). - Polygamy is rampant in the region, despite large public
outcry amongst Russians about the practice.
a. Putin has allowed him this freedom in exchange
for his loyalty and his willingness to fight
extremism. - Mosque’s build in the area are headed by Imam’s
trained in Russian universities where they are taught
less radicalized brands of Islam (Nemstova, Fagan,
Nurullina).
a. When studying Chechnya, Fagan contends that
the key difference into which regions became
violent and which didn’t was how strong the
population had been tied to their church.
i. Nurullina discusses that though there are
20 million Muslims in Russia, very few
attend formal Mosques.
ii. With so few attending Mosque’s, the
filtering of less extreme ideas is less easily
contained.
iii. The violent regions in Chechnya were the
ones in which regular Mosque attendance
was minimal (Radu). - Individuals who don’t attend
Mosque are more prone to
radicalization and violence (Radu).
b. The Kremlin, realizing this relationship, has
invested millions in formally training Imams
friendly to their vision of Islam.
i. Kadyrov is a practitioner of this brand of
Islam and has facilitated the building of
Mosques where this brand can be taught.
(Ioffe)
b. With the relationship between radicalization and formal Mosques
being knows, the government has begun a more inclusive dialogue
about how to filter out extremism.
i. They train less radical Imams, and install them in Mosque’s
where extremism might pop up.
ii. They allow Muslims to live semi-autonomously.
iii. They have installed a Sufi Muslim friendly to Moscow to ensure
the region remains stable.
VI. Conclusion
a. Russia has began a more accepting dialogue with the Muslim
community in an effort to reduce the attractiveness of radical, violent
sects of Islam within the nation—especially in the Caucasus,
Chechnya.
i. The opening of this Mosque is a symbolic gesture to show
Putin’s friendliness with the faith.
ii. Though traditionally at odds with Islam, the Chechen wars
taught the Kremlin that by being less-inclusive they were
fostering radicalization of the regions Muslims. - The formal training of Muftis in state-sanctioned
universities highlights how Russia wants to control the
ideas being spread in these communities.
a. This new policy concerning Muslims is
exemplified in the installation of Kadyrov in
Chechnya.
i. He has fought extremism there, while still
allowing Islam to flourish in its own way,
even if it is at odds with traditional
Russian values. - The Kremlin has allowed this.
iii. This will continue to be an interesting case not only
domestically for Russia, but as it pertains to it’s treatment of
other Islamic nations as it attempts to maintain control over
it’s new territories.
Works Cited
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Nurullina, R. (2014). The Revival of Muslim Communities in Russia's Regions.
Anthropology & Archaeology of Eurasia, 52(2), 33-53.
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Fagan, G. (2013). A word of justice: Islam and state repression in North-West Caucasus.
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Sample Solution