War on Terror

Case Study Essay The Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal: Bad apples in a rotten barrel Introduction Torture is an inhumane practice whereby intense pain is inflicted on individuals to obtain intelligence, intimidate or terrorize; sometimes it is to derive sadistic pleasure (Sussman, 2005). In relation to the torturing of Iraqi detainees by the US military at Abu Ghraib prison in 2003, a combination of these motivations was at play. Intelligence gathering, however, appears to be the primary motivation given that this was a crucial organizational goal in the War on Terror (WoT) (Scheslinger report, in Danner, 2004). Evidence in support of this comes from the Taguba report (in Danner, 2004, p. 294), which found that Military Intelligence interrogators (MIs) had ordered Military Police guards (MPs) to ‘set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses’. These ‘conditions’, as seen in the shocking images released to the public in 2004, include Iraqi detainees being: forced to engage in humiliating sexual acts; threatened with dogs and electrocution; placed in painful positions; and physically beaten (Danner, 2004). Not included in the photos, but highlighted in the Taguba report (ibid.), is probable evidence of rape and detainees being doused in phosphoric liquid. Alarmingly, the comments of one private MI suggest that Abu Ghraib does not even represent the worst of detainee maltreatment in Iraq (Finn, 2016). A number of senior US actors are implicated in the crimes at Abu Ghraib (Huggins, 2010). For example, Lieutenant General Sanchez approved a number of the techniques seen in the photographs (Hooks and Mosher, 2005), and actively encouraged MIs and MPs to work in partnership to emotionally manipulate detainees and exploit their weaknesses (Danner, 2004). The Bush administration also went to great lengths to develop legitimate justifications ‘to support abusive interrogation techniques’ (Human Rights Watch, 2011). And, Huggins (2010) has shown how private military contractors and other corporate elements facilitated torture at Abu Ghraib; the latter includes medical staff that advised on the use of torture and firms who constructed ‘cold-hot’ holding facilities. Blakeley’s (2009) concept of torture as state terrorism is apt in the case of Abu Ghraib. However, as the events at Abu Ghraib also involved private elements, Kramer and Michalowski’s (2006) concept of state-corporate crime is also fitting. These two concepts could potentially be merged, which would allow this event to be framed as state terrorism, whilst incorporating all the actors involved in torture. Abu Ghraib is a pertinent manifestation of the phenomenon of state-approved torture by a supposedly democratic nation. Many countries that publicly condemn the practice of torture are the same countries that engage in it, with the US ‘the most blatant and hypocritical offender’ (Green and Ward, 2004, p. 146). The case study examined herein is the response to the scandal at Abu Ghraib by the elite in the US government and military. Responses have come in various forms of denial, often isolating the behavior to that of a few ‘bad apples’ (Hooks and Mosher, 2005). These responses allow for the evasion of responsibility, despite some at senior levels having set the conditions favorable for the abuse of detainees (Finn, 2016). Cohen’s (2001) denial framework will be utilized to categorize the functions of a number of responses, whilst the theory of organizational deviance (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006) will be applied to discredit the elite’s individualistic narrative, and ultimately show that these ‘bad apples’ were cultivated in a rotten barrel. Research question The research question is two-fold, and asks: (1) How can Cohen’s (2001) denial framework facilitate our understanding of responses to claims of torture by liberal democracies? And; (2) How can the theory of organizational deviance be utilized to explain the use of torture at Abu Ghraib? Methodology This study takes an “intensive approach”, meaning that it is interested in studying a single, particular instance, i.e. a case study, of the phenomenon in question (Swanborn, 2010). The 2004 Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal, specifically the responses given by elite government and military officials, is both the case study and unit of analysis (Yin, 2014). This case study will involve discourse analysis (DA), which is concerned with language in use, and can reveal much about the ‘communicative and social goals of the speaker’ (Mithun, 2015, p. 12). Various responses by administration and military actors have been identified from newspaper and journal articles, books and televised speeches. These responses will be analyzed using Cohen’s (2001) framework, which establishes various manifestations of denial from literal to implicatory. Organizational deviance will be introduced in the second half of the Theories section. Case studies are often noted for their lack of generalizability (Merriam, 2009), but as is noted in Cohen (2001), responses by governments to accusations of wrongdoing are frequently met with denial, albeit in different forms. One area where case study research is generally lacking is in clear definition. Gerring (2006, p. 17) points to eight different descriptions for case study (and double the amount of synonyms), calling it ‘a definitional morass’. Case study research is in need of more clear demarcation from other research methods. Nonetheless, the naturalistic quality of case study research can make it a useful tool for studying human nature through real-life events (Gillham, 2000) and is appropriate for the purposes of this study which seeks answers to “how” questions (Merriam, 2009). Theories 1.1 Denial It may have been assumed that pictorial evidence of the atrocities at Abu Ghraib would severely limit the ability to deny allegations of torture. However, whilst “literal denial” was understandably not an option, the elite turned to other forms of denial to frame Abu Ghraib as an aberration. Many responses concede that the events occurred, yet use the common method within “interpretative” denial of isolating the incident, which ‘denies the systematic, routine or repeated quality attributed to the act’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 109). As well as being an isolated incident, deviance is often the result of “bad apples”. The “bad apples” concept is used to describe deviant individuals who contaminate an otherwise wholesome team (Punch, 2003). As Danner (2004) notes, this concept is frequently cited by governments in response to claims of torture. Whilst it is not the intention herein to imply that torture was utilized by all military personnel, with some individuals adamantly refusing to contravene the Geneva Convention (SASC, 2008), the following response by Brigadier General Kimmit is still misleading as to the broader pattern of torture in Iraq: “The first thing I’d say is we’re appalled as well. These are our fellow soldiers. These are the people we work with every day, and they represent us…so what would I tell the people of Iraq? This is wrong. This is reprehensible. But this is not representative of the 150,000 soldiers that are over here… I’d say the same thing to the American people… Don’t judge your army based on the actions of a few” (CBS News, 2004). Using Cohen’s (2001) denial framework, this example would fall within the “partial acknowledgment” category. This example veers more towards acknowledgement than denial; however, such acknowledgement includes ‘spatial isolation’. This allows for acknowledgement of events whilst simultaneously presenting them as the unapproved actions of a few individuals (ibid.). Kimmit’s response neglects the fact that similar acts of torture occurred at numerous other sites in Iraq, as well as further afield in Afghanistan and Guantanamo (Ross, 2007). Other responses, whilst also acknowledging wrongdoing, claim that torture at Abu Ghraib was far worse pre-US invasion. Rumsfeld, in a televised speech at Abu Ghraib prison in May 2004, said: “The things that happened in the prison under Saddam Hussein were horrific. Thousands and thousand and thousands of human beings mistreated, tortured, and killed. In recent months we’ve seen abuses here, under our responsibility, and it’s been a body blow for all of us. But it doesn't represent America, it doesn't represent American values” (C-SPAN, 2004). Here, Rumsfeld utilizes “implicatory” denial, specifically the technique of “advantageous comparison” (Cohen, 2001). He contrasts the US’s ‘own harmful acts with the more reprehensible inhumanities committed by [their] adversary’ (ibid., p 111), and in so doing attempts to minimize their actions as incomparable to the torture perpetrated by others. Rumsfeld is at pains to note the number of victims ‘mistreated, tortured, and killed’ by the Iraqi regime, without similarly quantifying the amount of torture practiced (and on how many victims) by the US military. It is also significant to note that whilst Rumsfeld explicitly labels these actions as torture when practiced under Hussein, he simply calls them ‘abuses’, and uncharacteristic, when practiced by the US. In fact, in one speech, Rumsfeld adamantly refused ‘to address the 'torture' word’ (Brown, 2005, p. 977), maintaining the “abuse” label. In these instances he uses the interpretative denial strategy of calling torture something else (Cohen, 2001). Bush made a similar speech to Rumsfeld’s televised one in the same month, where he attempted to salvage America’s image. He referred to the actions of the US military as ‘disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values’ (Bush, 2004). Bush’s response frames these individuals ‘as “in” but not “of” the nation’ (Brown, 2005, p. 977). This strategy distances these troops from the rest of the in-group so as not to threaten the stability of the in-group’s social identity (Tarrant et al., 2012). The analysis of these responses by high-level officials in the case of the Abu Ghraib torture scandal is important to show how the employment of narratives such as “bad apples” and “spatial isolation” dissuades closer examination of organizational structures, and those who control them. 1.2 Organizational Deviance Organizational deviance is being used here to highlight the systemic, as opposed to individualistic, nature of torture at Abu Ghraib prison, which is missing in the responses of the elite. Here the emphasis is taken away from low-level “bad apples” (whilst not absolving them), to focus on the organizational structures that foster torture. In doing so it breaks free of the “Washington mentality” that protects the elite from criminal accountability (Huggins, 2010). Kramer and Michalowski (2006, p. 24) contend that deviance occurs at the organizational level due to demands related to achieving goals, ‘the availability and perceived attractiveness of illegitimate means‘ to attain said goals, and the absence of regulation. The authors’ (ibid.) integrated theoretical model of state-corporate crime is also useful for explaining the different motivations and opportunities for organizational deviance at various levels. Using this model, it is evident that deviance is embedded within all levels, from institutional (macro), to organizational (meso) as well as interactional (micro). The organizational goal at institutional level in the WoT was to gather valuable intelligence in a war, and against an enemy, that it was inexperienced in fighting, to counter the threat of further terrorist attacks. According to Smeulers and van Niekerk (2009, pp. 329-330), whilst the CIA had many years of experience in fighting the Cold War, the ‘War on Terror was of an entirely different nature and the effectiveness of legitimate means in this struggle was considered to be extremely doubtful’. The idea that legitimate means would not suffice is seen quite early on, with action quickly taken to reinterpret the law and make illegitimate means justifiable. For example, the Bush administration decided the Geneva Convention would not apply ‘in Afghanistan or elsewhere’ (Rumsfeld, 2002, cited in Donnelly, 2013, p. 117), and that only pain equivalent to organ failure or death would constitute as torture (Smeulers and van Niekerk, 2009). The extreme distinction between torture and coercion guided organizational processes on the ground. At the meso level, opportunities for deviance can occur when standard operating procedures (SOP) are defective (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006). According to Captain Wood, the Interrogation Officer in Charge at Abu Ghraib, there was not even a SOP in place when she took command of the prison (SASC, 2008). In fact, at the beginning there were said to be five alternative versions of rules circulating in the prison, none of which provided clear boundaries for im/permissible interrogation methods (Ajunwa, 2014). Techniques authorized by Donald Rumsfeld for specific use at Guantanamo prison somehow transferred to Afghanistan and Iraq where they were quickly adopted, with Cole (2009, p. 17) noting that ‘once the line of physical coercion was officially breached, a culture quickly developed that fostered unauthorized abuse’. The Scheslinger report (in Danner, 2004) cites the lack of leadership and supervision by senior military staff, lack of resources, and an unclear chain of command between MPs and MIs, as factors that helped to set conditions for torture. Yet some of these explanations still tend to interpret deviance as individual failings. This is not to insinuate the opposite, namely that organizations are anthropomorphic entities capable of physically creating deviance. Higher-level actors possess the power and influence over organizational structures (Monahan and Quinn, 2005), and identifying their complicity is necessary. The crucial point is that removal of key individuals will not simultaneously eliminate an issue (Huggins, 2010). Too individualistic an approach (at any level) shields institutions from critical evaluation (Pearce, 1978). Detainee abuse is systemic (Hooks and Mosher, 2005), and an issue for the US both domestically and abroad (Ajunwa, 2014). Monahan and Quinn (2006) rightfully call for a shift away from assigning individual blame to “bad apples” or “weak leaders”, and instead a move towards examining the formal structures of the organization that facilitate deviance. Hooks and Mosher (2005, p. 1630) argue that the US has created a ‘rationalized system of violence’ in which a number of abusive policies are embedded. This system of violence predates the WoT. The use of torture by the US is evident throughout history, with the practice of waterboarding used against adversaries in the Philippine-American war a century before the WoT (Blakeley, 2009). The use of stress positions and sensory deprivation are also evident in guidance laid out in CIA manuals from the 1960s (Hooks and Mosher, 2005). This shows how Abu Ghraib is not only one of many sites of torture in the WoT (Brown, 2005), but merely one act in a long-running play. As Zimbardo (2009, p. 381) has noted, the “bad apples” in the case of Abu Ghraib are just minor actors, and it is the ‘directors, scriptwriters, and stage managers who made this tragic play possible’. These latter roles are what Huggins (2010, p. 84) calls the “facilitators”, who make the organizational provisions that perpetuate torture long after the “direct perpetrators” have exited the stage. Torture’s longevity lies in the hands of the state. Conclusion The concept of state-corporate terrorism is apt in the case of Abu Ghraib, where multiple elements from the state and private sphere worked together to facilitate the inhumane treatment of detainees. The case study herein has highlighted the strategic narratives of denial employed by high-level officials in response to claims of torture, and how their responses serve the function of evading responsibility, or discouraging critical assessment of the more powerful elements of the state system. Cohen’s (2001) framework was utilized to show how the administration and military attempted to isolate the events at Abu Ghraib spatially and the perpetrators socially (segregating them from the in-group). Organizational deviance has been drawn upon as a concept better equipped to explain the events at Abu Ghraib than the frequent individualistic “bad apples” concept, with Kramer and Michalowski’s (2006) model used to uncover some of the motivations and opportunities that set the conditions for torture. Torture occurred at multiple sites, from Guantanamo to Afghanistan and Iraq. The events at Abu Ghraib cannot be focused on, dealt with, and remembered in history, as the work of a handful of individuals in one cellblock. Abu Ghraib was not a case of a few “bad apples” contaminating the barrel – these individuals operated in an organized system of violence. Within the case study : •State the topic area, why it is interesting and your research question •Explain how you will address the question •Engage with other theories or concepts that have been applied to this case or similar cases, or that you think have a bearing •Investigate a broad range of empirical sources •Analyse the case from different aspects and perspectives •Evaluate the case study both in terms of what has happened and in terms of any reflections on the theoretical implications, coming back to the literature    

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