Find an article from a recent (within the last seven years) issue of an APA journal with a focus on Personality such as; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology or Personality And Personality Disorders . The article should describe specifically an experimental manipulation (meaning that the study is a true experiment with an easily identifiable independent and dependent variable) by the researchers Prepare a 1-3 page summary of the article in your own words including specifics regarding the overall purpose of the research in question, a clear statement of the researchers hypothesis, details regarding the study methodology, and pertinent results of the manipulation. Also include your personal opinion of the work. Should it be repeated/ how can it be improved? What was your overall impression of the work? What are the implications of the study for the practice of counseling psychology?
Modal realism is the view propagated by David Kellogg Lewis. Lewis thinks that all possible worlds are as real as the actual world. It is surrounded by the following tenets: the existence of possible worlds; possible worlds are irreducible entities; possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world; the term actual in actual world is indexical, i.e. any subject can state their world to be the actual one, much as they label the place they are “here” and the time they are “now”. The term goes back to Leibniz’s theory of possible worlds, used to analyse necessity, possibility, and similar modal notions. In short: the actual world is considered as merely one among an infinite set of logically possible worlds, some “nearer” to the actual world and some more remote. A proportional suggestion is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds and possible if it is true in at least one. Main doctrines At the heart of David Lewis’s modal realism are six central doctrines about possible worlds: Possible worlds exist – they are just as real as our world; Possible worlds cannot be abridged to something more basic – they are irreducible entities in their own right. Possible worlds are the same sort of things as our world – they can be different in content, not in kind; Possible worlds are causally secluded from each other. Possible worlds are amalgamated by the spatiotemporal interrelations of their parts; every world is spatiotemporally isolated from every other world. Actuality is indexical. When we differentiate our world from other possible worlds by claiming that it alone is actual, we mean only that it is our world. Reasons given by Lewis Lewis supports modal realism for a number of reasons. First, there doesn’t seem to be a reason. Many abstract mathematical entities are added simply because they are helpful. For example, sets are useful, abstract mathematical thing that were only visualized in the 19th century. Sets are now measured to be objects in their own right, and while this is a philosophically unintuitive idea, its usefulness in understanding the workings of mathematics creates faith in it worthwhile. The same thing should go for possible worlds. Since these have assisted us to make sense of key philosophical concepts in epistemology, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, etc. Their existence should be unanimously accepted on pragmatic grounds. Lewis condemns that the idea of alethic modality can be condensed to talk of real possible worlds. For example, to say “x is possible” is to say that there situates a possible world where x is true. To say “x is required” is to say that in all possible worlds x is factual and accurate. The appeal to possible worlds presents a sort of economy with the least number of undefined primitives/axioms in our ontology. By Taking this latter point one step further, Lewis says that modality cannot be made sense of without such a reduction. He upholds that we cannot settle on that x is possible without a origin of what a real world where x holds would look like. In other words, it is possible for basketballs to be inside of atoms whether we do not merely formulate a linguistic determination of whether the proposition is grammatically rational and coherent. We essentially think about whether a real world would be able to sustain such a state of affairs or not. Thus, we need a brand of modal realism if we want to use modality at all. Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle’s Plurality of Worlds The French philosopher and writer Fontenelle (1657-1757) was well-known for popularizing science and philosophy in a lively, elegant and dynamic way. His Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes (Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds) (Fontenelle 1686) propagated an elucidation of the Copernicus’ heliocentric model of the universe in popular language. It was an instantaneous success and revolutionary work. The book offered a number of conversations between a heroic philosopher (Fontenelle himself) and a Marchioness. The question about life on other worlds was come up and one of the main troubles to be discussed was the following one: are the inhabitants of these planets have similarity like us or are they quite different from ours? Here is Fontenelle’s observation. The inhabitants of the solar system are very diverse from one planet to another. On the Moon, where there is no air, no water, no cloud, no protection against the Sun, the Salinities live beneath the surface in deep wells that possibly could be seen through our telescopes. But the Marchioness looks very uncertain about the humming and hawing coming from his lovely teacher regarding the description of life on the Moon: “it’s a lot of ignorance based on very little science”, she narrates. She has the emotion that Fontenelle is going to populate all the planets and she is at once besieged by the “unlimited number of inhabitants possibly to be on all these planets”. How can we visualize these planet dwellers, so different indeed if nature is opposed to repetitions? Fontenelle delights himself imagining that distinctions boost up as the planets become more and more far-away from the Sun. Fo>