Safety Culture

Be sure to read the two assigned chapters on safety culture in Manuele’s Advanced Safety Management 3rd
edition, along with Chapter 3 in Manuele’s 2nd edition version of the same book (see the required readings).
There is a really good discussion on safety culture in the 2nd edition that didn’t make it to the 3rd edition that
we will discuss here (starting on page 67) (ERAU Hunt Library – ProQuest): (Links to an external site.)
“In every organization, what management does is translated directly into a system of expected performance––
the reality of the culture––and that system affects, positively or negatively, decisions taken with respect to
management systems, design and engineering, operating methods, and arrangement of work methods.”
Mr. Manuele then provides three examples that demonstrate how safety culture either allowed a condition
wherein “determining and eliminating or controlling systemic causal factors (was) not necessary,” or where the
safety culture “accommodated a system of expected performance which condoned hazardous situations and
supported excessive risk taking.”
For this discussion, consider the following three examples from Manuele (2nd ed.):
“I believe that our risks are overlooked and a lot of risk taking is accepted. I say that because all of the incident
investigation reports that hit my desk put the responsibility for what happened on the worker. The reports
always say things like they reinstructed the worker or discussions about safety were held with the workers or
the safe practice rules are being reinforced. They don’t ever really analyze the situation.”
Two workers refuse to do a job, saying that the work is too hazardous. Another worker is assigned by a
supervisor to do the work, and he becomes a fatality.
There is deterioration in a tray of electrical cables, and occasionally the workers experience a minor jolt. In the
maintenance department, work orders are reshuffled every Monday to establish priorities for the overly
stressed maintenance personnel. Each week, the work order to make the needed repairs to the insulation in
the cable tray is given a low priority. Over time, little notice is given to the jolts, and the hazard’s potential is
played down. An occasional jolt becomes an accepted norm. Deterioration continues. A worker makes contact
that results in his electrocution.
What do these scenarios say about cultural and operational/organizational factors for these situations? How do
we encourage employers to shift to a culture of determining and eliminating or controlling systemic causal
factors, rather than just focusing on unsafe acts? What can a safety and health professional do to enhance or
engineer a positive safety culture or climate within an organization?
Explain and support your response.

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